lundi 19 mai 2008
Offensive islamiste à l'université de Dakar
La poussée de l'islam au campus est l’œuvre d’étudiants regroupés en Dahiras. Ils organisent des séances dédiées à leur khalife, le guide spirituel. Il est 21 heures, une vingtaine de jeunes vêtus pour la plupart de kaftans reprennent en chœur des chants religieux, « Allah la illah ». Juste à côté, d’autres, assis sur des nattes ou à même le sol, égrènent les perles de leurs chapelets. On n’est pas à Touba, ni à Tivaouane (villes saintes de l’islam sénégalais, ndlr), encore moins dans une mosquée, mais dans le hall du pavillon A de l’université Cheikh Anta Diop. En effet, de plus en plus de jeunes étudiants pratiquent publiquement l’islam de manière ostentatoire.
Accroupi près d’un fourneau sur lequel se trouve une marmite de café, Amadou Ndaw, étudiant en licence d’anglais est un talibé mouride. Vêtu d’un grand boubou bleu, pieds nus, il est chargé de préparer et de servir aux fidèles « le café Touba ». Il soutient : « Je suis fier de troquer le temps d’une soirée mon habit d’étudiant pour celui de disciple pour être au service de Cheikh Amadou Bamba. A travers le « Dahira », nous vulgarisons la pensée de notre guide spirituel, afin de conquérir le maximum de jeunes. »
Ce fidèle ne voit aucun inconvénient à ce que de telles manifestations soient organisées au sein du campus social, car ils sont avant tout des étudiants et jouissent des mêmes droits que les autres. Qu’en pensent les autres étudiants laïcs et chrétiens ? Pour trouver une réponse à mon interrogation, je rends visite aux locataires des chambres situées au rez-de-chaussée.
A proximité du hall, je rentre dans la chambre de Joseph Preira, étudiant en lettres modernes et catholique de confession : « Veuillez fermer d’abord la porte, car avec ces gens-là, on ne pourra pas s’entendre », me lance mon hôte, assis sur son lit, un cahier sur les jambes. Il déclare : « Il n’est pas possible de concevoir qu’un lieu de repos soit transformé en lieu de prière, car chaque chose a son temps et a son lieu. Ce n’est pas pour rien que des mosquées et des églises sont construites hors des pavillons. Je ne parle pas en tant que chrétien, mais en tant qu’être humain soucieux du respect des droits de l’homme, qui à mon avis, sont violés dans cette affaire. »
Kéba Touré, un étudiant musulman en lettres partage la même chambre que Joseph. Il dit ne pas être contre le fait que ces étudiants vivent leur foi, mais il déplore le dérangement. Pour lui : « Un bon musulman est celui qui fait tout pour entretenir de bonnes relations avec ses voisins. C’est comme ça tous les soirs, ils sont là jusqu’à minuit, ce qui perturbe notre sommeil et notre quiétude. Les périodes de contrôles et d’examens, par exemple, sont parfois troublées par ces minorités agissantes qui envahissent tous les espaces : halls, couloirs, chambres, salles d’études et de réunions, terrains vagues. »
A l’image de ces deux jeunes, tous les étudiants laïcs musulmans et chrétiens interviewés ont dénoncé cette offensive de l’islam confrérique et de l’islam intégriste dans l’espace universitaire. Mais ce qui est étonnant, c'est que ces mêmes étudiants, au début ou à la fin de l’interview, me demande de ne pas citer le numéro de leur chambre. Mais de quoi ont-ils peur ?
Ousmane Diallo, un étudiant en géographie me confie : « La majeure partie des étudiants habitant le rez-de-chaussée sont contre ces pratiques, mais des actions n’ont jamais été menées pour alerter les autorités universitaires. » Il pense que les gens ont peur d’éventuelles représailles de ces fidèles qui, selon lui, ne sont pas tous des étudiants. Joseph, de son côté, considère que c’est un sujet sensible : « Si les étudiants musulmans en particulier ne réagissent pas, c’est parce qu’ils craignent que l’on doute de leur foi. »
Aujourd’hui deux camps s’opposent au campus social de l’université Cheikh Anta Diop, d’une part ceux qui veulent imposer l’islam dans le campus et, d’autre part, ceux qui défendent la laïcité de l’espace universitaire.
Youssouph BodianMusulmans en Allemagne
Institute of Islamic Studies
“Muslims in Germany”
A Study Conducted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior
On:
Integration, Barriers to Integration, Religion and Attitudes Toward Democracy, the
Constitutional State, and Politically and Religiously Motivated Violence
Results of Surveys Within the Framework of a Multicentric Study in Urban Environments, by
Kathrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, 509 p., Hamburg 20071
Results of the Study – A Summary
Christine Schirrmacher
Why this study?
Shortly before the end of the year 2007, an extensive study published by the Federal
Ministry of the Interior appeared under the title “Muslims in Germany”. Under the direction
of the Hamburg criminologists Karin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, the study inquired into the
attitudes of Muslims in Germany in regard to integration and democracy, the rule of law, and
politically and religiously motivated violence. This volume of more than 500 pages of
statistics, as well as the analysis of the answers obtained from nearly 1700 respondents from
various areas of the society, represents a relevant survey which, on the basis of the extent of
the data gathered and its well-founded scientific treatment, provides insights into themes for
which knowledge for a long time has appeared urgently desirable. For this reason, the study
fills a genuine gap, even though partial studies to a lesser extent on individual aspects already
have been conducted.
Data was gathered and analyzed beginning in 2004; the entire investigation, initiated
by the Interior Minister at that time, Otto Schily, thus covered a period of three years. The
survey was limited to several urban centers; rural areas could not be surveyed. Even if one
takes into consideration that urban centers, with a larger number of Muslims and a larger
array of mosques and cultural associations, display the special character of Muslim social life,
there exists on the other hand no reason to assume that the findings obtained in the urban area
would deviate significantly from those in the rural area.
The study is significant at the present point in time because it is a contribution to the
urgently needed assessment of the state of Muslim life in Germany. After a long history of
refusing to acknowledge that the Muslim “guest workers” of the 1960s would live
permanently in Germany and the, to a great extent, unplanned and uncontrolled immigration
of people on the basis of political persecution, the search for asylum, economic distress, as
well as the belated arrival of family members in the past decades, it was high time to deal with
1
The study can be ordered at no cost from: Publikationsversand der Bundesregierung, Postfach 48 10 09, 18132
Rostock; a download of the complete study, as well as a shortened version (36 p.), is available under
www.bmi.bund.de.
the social and political positioning of the Muslim portion of the population that has grown to
3.2 – 3.5 million people today.
In addition, the study is of significance in a time in which numerous terrorist attacks
have been carried out by Muslim terrorists and extremists. Security experts do not at all
consider the danger in Germany, either, to be eliminated. For this reason, such a study is, in
the end, also a precondition for being able to recognize a possible threatening scenario
produced by extremist forces, and for being able to consider possible countermeasures.
Thereby – and security experts are united to a great extent in their opinion on this – it is
important not only to register that portion of the Muslim population that already justifies
religiously motivated violence or even is prepared to carry out attacks or already has
participated in them, but also to understand what arguments are used and in what areas such a
great distance to German society, or even rejection of the legal system of the Federal
Republic, exists, so that the ground for radicalization and extremism can be prepared through
the efforts of religiously-founded fundamentalism.
Target Groups of the Study
Before appearance of the study, the question of how large the portion of the Muslim
population in Germany might be that advocated religiously and politically motivated violence
was answered in most cases by referring to the 1% of the Muslim population (about 30,000)
who were members of extremist organizations. The study by the Ministry of the Interior also
shows that only a minority of the Muslim population in Germany sympathizes with extremist
positions and endorses religiously motivated violence. However, this is no reason to lean back
and be unconcerned. Simple answers are no longer permitted after reading the study
“Muslims in Germany”; the problems are much too complex to be dealt with by making
reference to only 1% who are members in extremist Islamic groups.
The study is divided into four areas that correspond to the surveys of four target
groups and to the analysis of their answers: The first survey is directed toward a non-specific
group of the Muslim resident population that was reached by means of a standardized
telephone survey of approximately 1,000 persons. The results of this survey are compared
with the answers from three specific groups: 500 students in the ninth and tenth grades
between fourteen and eighteen years of age; 150 Muslim university students; 60 members or
activists in Islamic associations, organizations, and mosques.
Thus, answers from altogether more than 1700 Muslims were included in the
assessment. The level of education of those surveyed reached from the secondary school level
to the university level, the range in ages comprised the entire spectrum from fourteen years
onward, and the geographic area of the study was composed of the cities of Hamburg, Berlin,
Cologne, and Augsburg. The majority of those surveyed were of Turkish origin, which also
corresponds to the national distribution within the Turkish community in Germany.
Results
One first important result – even if it is not a surprising one when seen against the
background of earlier studies – was that the majority of Muslims in Germany attaches great
importance to its religion in theory and practice. “The findings of several studies on the
practice of religion show further that Islam exhibits an effectiveness in manifold forms that
penetrates deeply into the daily life of Muslims and presents a powerful force for the shaping
of daily life as well as for the structuring of social relationships” (21).
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In contrast to earlier surveys, it is clear that the number of those who describe
themselves as religious or even very religious has risen again in the last years. Over 85% of
the Muslims in Germany describe themselves as “religious” or “very religious” (138).
The number of those who attend mosque at least once a week increased between 2000 and
2005 from 30.7% to 41.6% (22). Fundamentalist political tendencies can be attributed only to
a minority; the majority has a traditional, an orthodox, or a fundamentalist orientation in
regard to religion (140).
Not only the attendees at mosque has increased, but also, for example, the number of
those advocating the wearing of the headscarf for women: in 2005, 46.6% agreed with the
statement that women should wear a headscarf in public, while in 2000 only 27.2% had
affirmed this (23). And the number of those who have attended a Koran school also is
clearly higher among the younger Muslims in Germany than among those who are older
(112). Interestingly, the number is highest among those born in Germany: 60%. The
longer that attendance at a Koran school lasted, the more clearly a religiously
fundamentalist orientation can be observed (134) – which likewise cannot be surprising
when seen against the background of the results of earlier studies on the integration-inhibiting
role played by Koran schools.2
The study explicitly and rightly emphasizes that a religiously orthodox, old-fashioned
traditional, or fundamentalist orientation may not be equated rashly with the willingness to
commit violence or with extremism. Islam does not in any way teach terrorism as a goal of
faith, and whoever prays five times a day is in no way closer to violence and extremism than
the non-religious person. Whoever adheres to religious rites and convictions in a, to a large
extent, secular society may appear suspicious to some – but, by no stretch of the imagination
can he or she be termed a terrorist on this basis. In order to slide from a strict religious belief
into extremism, further motivating elements, attitudes, and developments (most Muslims
would say: wrong developments) are necessary so that, in the end, a person believing in Islam
becomes an advocate of struggle and violence against the “infidels”. In this area, too, that is,
in the explanation of the necessary differences between a believer and an extremist, the study
makes a valuable contribution.
1. The Muslim Resident Population
The answers from about 1000 persons were analyzed after a telephone survey; not
quite a third possessed German citizenship (192). But, only 12.2% defined themselves as
Germans (193). The average educational level of those surveyed was rather low: almost 70%
possessed a secondary school diploma or less; but only about 12% were academics (192,
193).
Integration
Of the respondents, 19.4% can be considered as poorly integrated linguistically and
socially, a further 37.6% as moderately integrated, only 32% as satisfactorily to well
integrated, and 11.9% as very well integrated (96), dependent upon the age of the person at
the time of immigration: “A successful integration, put into practice in everyday life, can be
identified only in somewhat more than 10%” (103) – in this clarity, a conclusion that must
give pause for serious thought and call for nothing short of political action. To be sure,
2
Wolfgang Ritsch, for example, came to this result as early as 1987: Die Rolle des Islams für die
Koranschulerziehung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Hochschulschriften 244, (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein,
1987).
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segregation and isolation are rejected by the overwhelming majority of over 80%, but the
neglect of one’s own culture is likewise also rejected (99). The willingness to integrate, of
course, exists, but it goes hand in hand with the necessity for retaining one’s own culture.
Nearly half of the Muslim resident population, for its part, feels rejected by the German
population (109).
Disparagement and the Readiness to Resort to Violence
Almost 90% are “infuriated” “when after terrorist attacks Muslims are always
suspected first” (108); they feel themselves as Muslims collectively and globally
marginalized. More than 90% reject the killing of other people in the name of God as
unjustifiable, and more than 90% consider a person who “encourages young Muslims to
commit suicide attacks or instructs them in doing so” to be “godless criminals” (177). On
the other hand, 44% agreed “somewhat” or “completely” with the statement that
“Muslims who die in armed struggle for the faith” enter “into Paradise”, that is, are
rewarded by God for their acts (176). Just under 40% consider “the use of physical
violence as a reaction to the threat presented to Islam by the West as legitimate” (191).
Religion and Religious Freedom
Almost 87% characterize themselves as personally religious or very religious, whereby
the level of devotion increases at a lower level of schooling (112). About 40% of the Muslim
resident population can be considered as “fundamentalist oriented” (195): 79.6% agreed
“completely” with the statement that the Koran is the true revelation of God; a further
9.4% agreed “somewhat”; together 89% (116). The daily regard for religion also goes hand
in hand with the high proportion of those who are convinced of the truth of their religion; the
rites and commandments of Islam are held in high esteem, even when they are not always
observed in detail (117).
Although it is evident in this segment of the population, as well as also in all others,
how highly religious freedom is esteemed in Germany, around 30% agree “completely” or
“somewhat” that it should be forbidden to persuade Muslims to change their religion
(118) – which would mean a restriction upon the public presentation of other religions and,
thus, a restriction upon religious freedom. Forty-five percent agreed “completely” or
“somewhat” that “only Islam is able to solve the problems of out time” (119). Further, 48.4%
“affirm the statement that democracy in Germany is one of the reasons for the high rate of
crime” (141); 46.7% agree “somewhat” or “completely” that “the observance of the
commandments of my religion … (is) more important for me than democracy” (141), which
corresponds roughly to the results of earlier surveys that about half of the Muslim population
in Germany considers the Koran and democracy to be incompatible. Further, 33.6% advocate
the death penalty, and about 9.4% advocate the punishments contained in Sharia for
Germany (141) – which in absolute figures corresponds to more than 300,000 people.
Radicalisms
With attendance at a Koran school, the consumption (exclusively) of non-German
media, as well as the exclusive participation in Islamic associations, the distance to
democracy and the distance to the rule of law increase considerably (167, 173), a
development which is discernible among about 10% of Muslims as a whole and is the higher
the less the linguistic-practical integration has been successful (173). The distance to
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democracy is greatest among the extremely religious (fundamentalist oriented), but in this
group applies only to a hard core of about 15% (173).
Especially susceptible to radicalisms appears, first of all, to be especially well-
educated groups that, to be sure, themselves have had little experience of discrimination
in Germany, but assume such for “the Muslims” globally. The second group of those in
danger of radicalization is composed of people with little education and an active
experience of discrimination; the third group includes people with a traditional religious
orientation – In consequence, it can be said that an individual’s lack of participation in
society, or that person’s marginalization, is certainly a problem, but for only a part of
Muslims is it a cause for a possible radicalization (166).
Adding the group of those maintaining a great distance to democracy to those
who to a great degree consider religiously and politically motivated violence to be
legitimate, the study assumes a proportion amounting altogether to 13.9% of the
Muslims in Germany (185), an “absolutely substantial minority with a problematic attitude
toward violence and/or democracy and the rule of law” (185) that shows a clear potential for
radicalization. “Only a small minority of 6% displays a high acceptance of politically and
religiously motivated violence” (190).
A sound education is thus a factor that makes a development toward
radicalization more unlikely, but does not exclude it, which is shown by the group of those
with a higher level of education but with a stronger rejection of the Western way of life and
the Western social order – for this reason, it is correct to emphasize the significance of
education since, in the segment with a greater level of education, a smaller proportion
approves of religiously and politically motivated violence, but, on the other hand, it is shown
empirically here that radicalism is not to be combated with education alone, since a
portion of educated persons also is found among those who advocate politically and
religiously motivated violence.
“On the whole, the results of this survey lead to the conclusion that, in the Muslim
resident population, a relevant potential on the level of personal attitudes exists that can be
suitable as a ground of resonance and a field of recruitment for radicalisms and
extremisms” (201).
2. Students of the Ninth and Tenth Grades
About 500 Muslim youth from various types of schools in Cologne, Augsburg, and
Hamburg were surveyed by written questionnaire together with non-Muslim youth so that a
comparison could be drawn between the various educational segments, but also between
Muslim and non-Muslim migrants as well as native non-Muslims.
Just about 40% of the Muslim students surveyed possessed German citizenship (212);
about 70% came from a Turkish background (213); 77% lived since birth in Germany
(214). Yet, here, too, a high proportion, 27.2%, felt themselves bound only to their home
country (219), which for most of them is the country of origin of their parents and
grandparents. Definite tendencies toward segregation from the majority society are discernible
in a third of the young people (265). Just over 10% express themselves affirmatively in
regard to the legitimacy of corporal punishment in Germany also (267), 14.2% are
assessed as critical of democracy (272), while, in comparison, 10.5% of German non-Muslims
hold the same view (337).
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Radicalisms
More than 15% of Muslim young people express anti-Semitic prejudices (275); to
a clearly lesser extent, however, prejudices against Christians. Among native non-Muslims,
however, the proportion of those who express prejudices against Muslims is, at almost a
fifth of those surveyed, still higher. Only 6.4% of Muslim youth is considered to be
sympathetic toward Islamism (295), but 24% are considered sympathetic toward
violence (310) – in contrast to 14.9% of native youth: “In sum, it therefore can be
established that a significantly heightened acceptance of violence is connected with the
affiliation with the Islamic religion” (312). Among non-Muslims (Christians), a contrary
tendency is discernible: a heightened religious consciousness lowers the affinity toward
violence to about 3% (315, 319).
Intolerance and Dissociation From Democracy
A great distance from democracy and the rule of law is evinced by 11.6% (306). “If
strong anti-Semitic or antichristian prejudices and/or great distance from democracy are
taken together as characteristics that define a group at risk, then, on the basis of the data in
hand, one can discern such problems for almost a quarter of young Muslims (23.8%). It is a
matter here of a minority that is not to be underestimated and that shows clear indications of
intolerance, distance to democracy, or authoritarian features” (308). If the aspect of the
advocacy of violence is combined with this figure, then the percentage rises to 29.2% (341),
more than a quarter of Muslim young people – a potential that is not insignificant and is not to
be neglected.
Whoever maintains his or her distance to democracy, entertains religious prejudices,
and is intolerant tends rather to advocate violence (339). Approximately a fourth of the
young people affirms its own readiness to exert corporal violence against unbelievers in
the service of the Islamic community (339). As a whole, this percentage of young people is
approximately twice as high as the percentage in the total Islamic population; “among the
young people, the potential of young Muslims responsive to political radicalization up to the
extent of excessive violence (is) noticeably higher than in the general population” (321),
especially among poorly educated young men with experience of discrimination and a
fundamentalist religious orientation (327). A religious orientation alone, or poor social
conditions, or the lack of educational opportunities, however, are in no way responsible for
the advocacy of violence. Parental experiences with violence, the traditional perception of
roles, and notions of masculinity play a greater role here (330).
The Significance of Religion
The percentage of young people who characterize themselves as religious is
87.2% (this percentage is somewhat higher than in the general population). Of these, 44.2%
can be characterized as fundamentalist oriented, for whom religion is of great significance in
daily life and who emphasize a faithful, rigid observance of the Koranic commandments
(262). In contrast, 45.6% of non-Muslim migrants describe themselves as religious; only
19.1% of native young people do so (242). Among Muslim youth, this heightened
religiousness is a concomitant of less education and a correlative longer attendance at a Koran
school, the result of which is a more intense fundamentalist orientation. Among native young
people, an increased religiousness is, conversely, a concomitant of a higher education (246,
262).
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Education and Exclusion
Striking is the fact that the educational level of Muslim youth (rate of attendance
at a Gymnasium: 14.6%) is significantly lower than among native young people (45.8%),
but also lower than among non-Muslim migrants (34.1%). Among Muslims, 63.3%
reported that they had “only a few” or “no German friends at all”; among non-Muslim
migrants, this was the case for only 47.1% (220).
The linguistic-practical integration of Muslim youth was significantly less than
that of non-Muslim youth; more than 40% have problems here (223, 224). Only 45.4%
of young Muslims advocate the adaptation of their conduct to German culture and
instead demand acceptance; in the general Muslim population, on the other hand, 82.6%
advocates adaptation (225). In consequence, young Muslims insist more strongly than non-
Muslims upon the maintenance of their own culture. At the same time, however, 35.9%
judges the German society receiving them as migrants as having a negative attitude toward
them; almost 80% report of incidents of rejection and negative treatment in the last twelve
months (241).
Apart from the clearly discernible distance maintained by many Muslim young people
toward German society is the fact that between 14.3% and 19.5% of native youth display
extremely xenophobic attitudes. The claim of a fundamental superiority of Germans over
other peoples is agreed to “somewhat” or “completely” by 15.3% (231); 43.4% have the
opinion that “most foreigners are criminals” (231). Among native German youth, 17.1%
encounter Muslims with intolerance and prejudice, and advocate violence (233); almost 50%
support the idea that foreigners who are unable or unwilling to accommodate
themselves should leave Germany (235) – here lies a considerable potential for conflict.
3. University Students
From a survey of a total of more than 1000 university students in Hamburg, Augsburg,
and Cologne, as well as the Charité in Berlin, just under 200 Muslim university students were
extracted as a third group for analysis. The overwhelming majority of the Muslims surveyed
here, too, came from a Turkish background; all those surveyed had studied for at last six
semesters.
Among the students, too, the culture of origin and the relationship and commitment to
one’s own roots played a large role, for in this segment of the population, too, it is
emphasized among more than half of the students that the maintenance of one’s native
culture, in spite of the – likewise extant – willingness to accommodate, is at the same time
important (417). Only 10% express a “primary cultural identification with
Germany” (363). From this, it can be concluded that the question of commitment to and
identification with the receiving society is not one of education. Those who are best integrated
can be seen as those who came to Germany already as children or young people (357). On the
whole, the rate of those who linguistically and socially are well or very well integrated
among the students is 78.9% (358).
Discriminations
Remarkable is the high percentage of Muslim students who mention rejection and
discrimination: More than 60% of Muslim students declare that, as foreigners, they
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already have been given “funny looks”; only a little more than 40% of non-Muslims
report this. More than 50% of Muslim students also cite discrimination from the police
or administrative agencies, which they attribute to the fact that they are foreigners,
while only about a third of non-Muslims see this so (365). Among Muslim students, 33.7%
report severe or very severe discrimination, a rate that is considerably lower among non-
Muslim students. Here, thus, it is obvious that certain incidents are interpreted by Muslims
differently than by non-Muslims, which can be substantiated clearly through the high rate of
agreement with a globally-felt marginalization of Muslims.
Here, one can recognize a clear connection between linguistic-practical integration and
the magnitude of personally-felt slights – the experience of victimization (367). Among
Muslim students, 43.2% feel rejected by the German population (369), and almost 83%
personally feel “rage” in response to the immediate suspicion of Muslims in regard to
terror attacks (371), which means a broad dissemination of the perception of collective
marginalization.
Religion and Democracy
Religion has great importance among students, also. Of them, 76.7% describe
themselves as religious; of these, just under 20% are very religious (373). More than two
thirds consider the Koran to be the true revelation of God (377). Here, too, religious
orthodoxy or traditionalism is not to be equated with extremism or the readiness to resort to
violence (402).
In comparison with the general resident population, the proportion of the
fundamentalist oriented – who, in correlation, show considerably lower levels of integration
as well as report higher rates of personally-experienced discrimination (388) – is above all
considerably lower among students, and the proportion of the moderately religious, at just
under 35%, is relatively higher (383). Nevertheless, 17.8% state that the religious
commandments in the Koran would have greater importance to them than democracy,
and about a third expressed themselves positively in a general way in regard to Sharia in
Germany, while, however, only 7% expressed unequivocal agreement (389). On the whole,
8.2% within the group of students are classed as “highly distant toward democracy” (390),
and 9.4% express anti-Semitic prejudices (non-Muslims with a migration background: 4.9%)
(394). The tendency toward authoritarian-Islamist, anti-Semitic, antichristian, and
democracy-distant attitudes among Muslim students is, at 14.9%, on the whole definitely
less than among high school students (23.8%) (403), but is still a significant minority.
Along with the approximately 6% of students with a sympathy for Islamism, there
exists a further quarter of students who are rigidly religious and declare a moderate distance to
democracy combined with a general affirmation of Sharia. Here, the willingness to
accommodate can be termed rather low, and the tendencies toward isolation are rather strong,
so that here, against the background of a strong perception of the marginalization of the
Muslim community and concretely experienced discrimination, the ground for radicalization
can be prepared easily (404). This critical potential among the students who are subject to
a latent danger of radicalization is estimated by the authors of the study to be of the
magnitude of roughly 30% when the advocacy of Sharia, a distance to democracy,
religious prejudices, and a rigid alignment on religion are included as compromising
factors (404, 405).
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Religiously and politically motivated violence is also cited much less frequently by the
students than on average in the Muslim population and is rejected by more than 80%. On the
whole, Muslim and non-Muslim students do not differ from each other significantly (415). In
general, it appears that it is the globally marginalized and oppressed position of Muslims
observed in foreign countries worldwide that comes into question as a factor for possible
radicalization rather than the personal experience of discrimination in Germany (416).
“Thus, also among the highly educated Muslims, as which students here must be
regarded, a high-risk group quite definitely can be more exactly located. Significant here –
along with a religious alignment in a form that bears in itself a strong devaluation of the
West and a wholesale upgrading of the value of Islam – is the intensive confrontation with
the position of Muslims in the world and the subjective perception of their discrimination
and oppression.” (420)
4. Activists in Islamic Associations and Organizations
As a fourth group, functionaries or activists in Islamic associations, mosques, and
organizations, as well their members, users, and those persons from their immediate
environment closely connected with them, were surveyed. Altogether, 60 male Muslims –
academics as well as non-academics – between the ages of 25 and 55 in the Hamburg area
were surveyed in personal interviews. In carrying out the interviews, a considerable effort was
necessary in order to dispel the misgivings of those interviewed about a possible
“eavesdropping” or “infiltration” of the associations, or also about the collection of data about
persons in the associations for use by the security agencies.
Here, too, the interview partners with a Turkish background were in the majority;
more than half the interview partners held German citizenship. The participants in the
interviews were without exception very religious (456); a portion expressed a strong
deprecation of Western societies (459), which were judged as morally depraved and two-
faced (466). The themes of global marginalization and oppression of Muslims assumes an
immensely important role in these interviews (486).
Exclusion
The esteem for freedom and basic rights, such as the freedom of religion and the rule
of law in Germany, were emphasized frequently. At the same time, all those interviewed
remarked that they, as Muslims, felt excluded and discriminated against in Germany and felt a
strong solidarity with the worldwide situation of Muslims, which they characterized very
emphatically as victims. Those interviewed complained that Islam in Germany is
discriminated against in comparison with Christianity, that is, that Islam is not treated as a
religion of equal status, so that Muslims in the workplace are limited in the practice of their
religion – whereby this state of affairs always was reported as applying to others, but no
impediment, for example, to prayer, was cited from personal experience (443, 444). As
evidence that Islam is discriminated against, limitations in the construction of mosques were
cited. State sponsorship and support of the construction of mosques, on the other hand,
would be acknowledged as a symbol of the equal recognition of Muslims in society (445).
Striking were the frequently exaggerated reports about a climate of prejudices,
hostilities, rejection, and discriminations against Muslims in Germany: “The descriptions
are to a great extent interspersed with the locution of Muslims as ‘victims’ expressed with the
most varied nuances … To be sure, this is substantiated to a certain extent with references to
9
details, which, however, in very few cases are attributed to direct personal experience.
Dominant is the description of the situation of others who one personally knows and about
which one knows” (441) or descriptions that show a strong distortion of the truth: “I am
treated here and looked upon as though I am a terrorist (as though one is a constant threat)
only because I come to prayer” (484). Only through the supposed treatment of Muslims as
terrorists in Germany, so the respondents, does aggression among Muslims arise:
“There is such an effort to discriminate [against Muslim women], that almost nothing any
more can be done with a headscarf … thus, one becomes aggressive” (484) – here, the
German society, because of its exclusion of Muslims, is considered the cause of violence.
Integration
In reaction, older persons appear rather to withdraw from German society, while
younger persons, as self-assured Muslims in Germany, demand that they be given
recognition (489), and have the vision of forming a kind of political or even economic
avant-garde. It is strongly emphasized by several, especially younger interview partners that
the Muslim community expects to be recognized by the receiving society just as they are
(485). Integration is considered to be a two-sided process and also as a debt to be paid by
the majority society: 91.6% of those surveyed advocate free German courses for
migrants (448). Up to the present, the feeling of not really belonging has been dominant,
even if German citizenship was acquired (450). Coldness, distance, and isolation are
mentioned frequently as characteristics of German society, which, so the respondents,
when all is said and done, would not acknowledge the migrants as their own – whatever the
migrants might be willing to do – and would demand assimilation (485). On the other hand,
the personal places of refuge, the mosque associations, and cultural organizations are named
critically by a portion of those surveyed as an obstacle to integration (454).
Extremism and Personal Liberties
A striking feature of the interviews was the frequently expressed complaint about the
constantly demanded separation and dissociation from “hate preachers” and extremists.
Muslim associations and mosques have “developed a distinct feeling … of being increasingly
in the focus of observation and always being exposed to the danger of being placed under the
suspicion of Islamism and of struggling against democratic structures” (426). In the
interviews, the opinion also was expressed that through its rejection of Muslims, German
society hinders their integration, reception into the society, and complete cultural
acceptance (478).
In the course of the survey, an ambivalent relationship to personal liberties in
Germany frequently came to light: on the one hand, a resort to personal liberties for the
purpose of asserting one’s own point of view (for example, the assertion of religious
instruction in one’s own religious orientation as the only correct one), which at the same
time is then rejected when positions deviating from one’s own views are at issue (for
example, religious instruction in other Muslim branches of faith) (480), or in the case of
marriage with non-Muslim partners: for sons barely accepted, but for daughters apodictically
rejected (481). Here, the expectation that the German state should introduce special
rights for Muslims also is formulated, as, for example, state promotion of and respect for
Islamic holidays or the application of Islamic law for the Islamic faith community
through the creation of a parallel legal society (481) – here, the rule of law as the principle
of legal sovereignty applying equally to the Muslim faith community is clearly rejected.
About one of the interview partners, it is said that “An accommodation of his conduct, or the
10
conduct of other Muslims, to the rules of the receiving German society is, in his eyes, an
unacceptable imposition” (482)
The existence of hate preachers and mosques in which extremism is preached is
conceded, but is judged critically as far as is possible. They are considered as a problem
and as doing harm to Muslims as a whole (462). The reaction of German society to the
extremist threat, however, is judged at the same time as discriminatory, exaggerated,
and, in the last analysis – for example, through identity checks in or before mosques – as
aggravating the threat (468). Muslims, it is believed, are “construed falsely by politics
internationally as a threatening factor” (473), whereby a third of those surveyed considers
the concern with extremism as out of place, a third as justified but highly exaggerated in
individual perception, and a third as justified.
Religiously and politically motivated violence is almost never openly promoted or
approved. On the other hand, a radicalization through a many times greater distance to
democracy, clear tendencies toward isolation, the often affirmed judgement of the Sharia as
superior to the Basic Law, the in part openly conceded dissociation from the rule of law, and
the demand for the limitation of the personal liberties of others (such as one’s own daughters
or wife) appears easily conceivable in this environment.
Finally, with the help of four individual biographical reports, it becomes clear how
processes of radicalization can come to pass in Germany: One cause can be a kind of
“awakening experience” through which earlier religious training is revived in a period in
which there is a lack of orientation and deep uncertainty and in which Islam is now
implemented in a comprehensive and rigid manner. Another way is the gradual entry into a
tradition of “true Islam” or of a stricter religious observance than usual in the parents’
home. This occurs frequently in a mosque or learning environment in which separation and
the superiority of the Sharia over Western values are preached. After this change in the
previously average religious person, a significantly heightened degree of religious rigidity and
depreciation of other Muslims who do not live consistently according to the rules of Islam is
reached that then quickly extends to complete dissociation from Western society and the
acceptance of violence in defence of religion or honor, as well as to the limitation of personal
liberties (for example, among the women in one’s own family) or to the struggle against
unbelief (471). If religious intolerance and strict orientation on rules combines with distance
to democracy and subjection to the authority of religious leaders who demand a rigid and also
a political implementation of Islam, then processes of radicalization can begin that end in the
turn to Islamism and in the willingness to use violence (477).
Summary
In the sum of the study, the great significance of religion for all Muslims in
Germany is striking, as well as the high percentage of those who confess their religion in
theory and practice. Fundamentalist religious orientations, however, are not synonymous
with distance to democracy, and distance to democracy is not automatically a sign of the
willingness to commit violence; other factors must be added here. It is, however, certainly the
case that the seed of radicalism can be sown more easily in this ground of the basically aloof
view of the Western way of life and society, a view that can change into extremism against
the background of personally experienced marginalization or the sense of the worldwide
oppression of Muslims. For this reason, the potential for danger is considerably greater than
the modest membership figures in the known Islamic-extremist associations might suggest.
11
Because of the manifold factors that can bring about a radicalization of
individuals, this latent potential for a politically and religiously motivated radicalization
in Germany, as the study emphasizes, can not be quantified clearly. The authors,
however, on the basis of the present investigation, assume a figure of approximately
10% to 12% of the Muslims in Germany (494), which means a number on the
magnitude of between 320,000 and 420,000 people.
Decisive for radicalization are, essentially, three different paths: For the first
path, the experience of a personal exclusion is less decisive than the vicarious sense of being
the victim of a global oppression and of finding one’s system of reference outside Western
society (in Sharia or in the umma, the Muslim world community), the notion of an
“exclusion, deprecation, and oppression of Muslims on a national as well as international
level” (494), for “In sum, a quite considerable portion of the Muslims living in Germany,
students as well as the general Muslim population, is convinced that the community of
Muslims in the global sense is discriminated against and treated poorly” (418). The second
group is basically willing to accommodate, but experiences personal rejection while at
the same time having few chances for participation in society because of a low level of
education. The third group is rather traditional in its religious orientation and of itself
withdraws from society without wanting to participate (494).
The potential for an affinity to violence among Muslims in Germany can be
quantified as just under 6%. If a great distance to democracy and a rejection of the rule
of law are added, then a figure of about 14% of the Muslims within the survey is
reached. By projection of this result upon the entire Muslim population in Germany,
and in consideration of possible sources of error, this percentage can lie between 11.9%
and 16.4% (495). The study concludes:
“Fundamentalist orientations that combine a close religious attachment, a high
relevance of religion in daily life, and a strong orientation on religious rules and rituals with
a tendency to exclude Muslims who do not observe these, as well as with the tendency
generally to heighten the value of Islam and to derogate Western, Christian-influenced
cultures, show an enormous dissemination. In the general population, about 40% are to be
assigned to such a pattern of orientation” (493)
Language acquisition and education, as well as social participation and the reduction
of prejudices, especially those prejudices held by non-Muslim youth toward Muslims, are thus
important social and political goals necessary for counteracting tendencies toward
radicalization in the Muslim community. However, they do not form the one, comprehensive
solution, since there are other elements in the process of radicalization – such as the perceived
worldwide victimization of Muslims, or a political and rigid instruction in Islam through a
religious authority. In any case, a fundamental potential for recruitment is found among
Muslim youth and young adults, and not among those who are older (501). For this
reason, it is important to the authors of the study that the dialogue be conducted openly, but
not indifferently.
“It seems to be the case that this search for meaning and the struggle for values
requires a dialogue and credible dialogue partners who, on the one hand, do not dismiss
Islam, and also do not encounter it with an arbitrary attitude, but rather themselves are
strong dialogue partners standing upon a solid foundation” (501)
“Muslims in Germany”
A Study Conducted by the Federal Ministry of the Interior
On:
Integration, Barriers to Integration, Religion and Attitudes Toward Democracy, the
Constitutional State, and Politically and Religiously Motivated Violence
Results of Surveys Within the Framework of a Multicentric Study in Urban Environments, by
Kathrin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, 509 p., Hamburg 20071
Results of the Study – A Summary
Christine Schirrmacher
Why this study?
Shortly before the end of the year 2007, an extensive study published by the Federal
Ministry of the Interior appeared under the title “Muslims in Germany”. Under the direction
of the Hamburg criminologists Karin Brettfeld and Peter Wetzels, the study inquired into the
attitudes of Muslims in Germany in regard to integration and democracy, the rule of law, and
politically and religiously motivated violence. This volume of more than 500 pages of
statistics, as well as the analysis of the answers obtained from nearly 1700 respondents from
various areas of the society, represents a relevant survey which, on the basis of the extent of
the data gathered and its well-founded scientific treatment, provides insights into themes for
which knowledge for a long time has appeared urgently desirable. For this reason, the study
fills a genuine gap, even though partial studies to a lesser extent on individual aspects already
have been conducted.
Data was gathered and analyzed beginning in 2004; the entire investigation, initiated
by the Interior Minister at that time, Otto Schily, thus covered a period of three years. The
survey was limited to several urban centers; rural areas could not be surveyed. Even if one
takes into consideration that urban centers, with a larger number of Muslims and a larger
array of mosques and cultural associations, display the special character of Muslim social life,
there exists on the other hand no reason to assume that the findings obtained in the urban area
would deviate significantly from those in the rural area.
The study is significant at the present point in time because it is a contribution to the
urgently needed assessment of the state of Muslim life in Germany. After a long history of
refusing to acknowledge that the Muslim “guest workers” of the 1960s would live
permanently in Germany and the, to a great extent, unplanned and uncontrolled immigration
of people on the basis of political persecution, the search for asylum, economic distress, as
well as the belated arrival of family members in the past decades, it was high time to deal with
1
The study can be ordered at no cost from: Publikationsversand der Bundesregierung, Postfach 48 10 09, 18132
Rostock; a download of the complete study, as well as a shortened version (36 p.), is available under
www.bmi.bund.de.
the social and political positioning of the Muslim portion of the population that has grown to
3.2 – 3.5 million people today.
In addition, the study is of significance in a time in which numerous terrorist attacks
have been carried out by Muslim terrorists and extremists. Security experts do not at all
consider the danger in Germany, either, to be eliminated. For this reason, such a study is, in
the end, also a precondition for being able to recognize a possible threatening scenario
produced by extremist forces, and for being able to consider possible countermeasures.
Thereby – and security experts are united to a great extent in their opinion on this – it is
important not only to register that portion of the Muslim population that already justifies
religiously motivated violence or even is prepared to carry out attacks or already has
participated in them, but also to understand what arguments are used and in what areas such a
great distance to German society, or even rejection of the legal system of the Federal
Republic, exists, so that the ground for radicalization and extremism can be prepared through
the efforts of religiously-founded fundamentalism.
Target Groups of the Study
Before appearance of the study, the question of how large the portion of the Muslim
population in Germany might be that advocated religiously and politically motivated violence
was answered in most cases by referring to the 1% of the Muslim population (about 30,000)
who were members of extremist organizations. The study by the Ministry of the Interior also
shows that only a minority of the Muslim population in Germany sympathizes with extremist
positions and endorses religiously motivated violence. However, this is no reason to lean back
and be unconcerned. Simple answers are no longer permitted after reading the study
“Muslims in Germany”; the problems are much too complex to be dealt with by making
reference to only 1% who are members in extremist Islamic groups.
The study is divided into four areas that correspond to the surveys of four target
groups and to the analysis of their answers: The first survey is directed toward a non-specific
group of the Muslim resident population that was reached by means of a standardized
telephone survey of approximately 1,000 persons. The results of this survey are compared
with the answers from three specific groups: 500 students in the ninth and tenth grades
between fourteen and eighteen years of age; 150 Muslim university students; 60 members or
activists in Islamic associations, organizations, and mosques.
Thus, answers from altogether more than 1700 Muslims were included in the
assessment. The level of education of those surveyed reached from the secondary school level
to the university level, the range in ages comprised the entire spectrum from fourteen years
onward, and the geographic area of the study was composed of the cities of Hamburg, Berlin,
Cologne, and Augsburg. The majority of those surveyed were of Turkish origin, which also
corresponds to the national distribution within the Turkish community in Germany.
Results
One first important result – even if it is not a surprising one when seen against the
background of earlier studies – was that the majority of Muslims in Germany attaches great
importance to its religion in theory and practice. “The findings of several studies on the
practice of religion show further that Islam exhibits an effectiveness in manifold forms that
penetrates deeply into the daily life of Muslims and presents a powerful force for the shaping
of daily life as well as for the structuring of social relationships” (21).
2
In contrast to earlier surveys, it is clear that the number of those who describe
themselves as religious or even very religious has risen again in the last years. Over 85% of
the Muslims in Germany describe themselves as “religious” or “very religious” (138).
The number of those who attend mosque at least once a week increased between 2000 and
2005 from 30.7% to 41.6% (22). Fundamentalist political tendencies can be attributed only to
a minority; the majority has a traditional, an orthodox, or a fundamentalist orientation in
regard to religion (140).
Not only the attendees at mosque has increased, but also, for example, the number of
those advocating the wearing of the headscarf for women: in 2005, 46.6% agreed with the
statement that women should wear a headscarf in public, while in 2000 only 27.2% had
affirmed this (23). And the number of those who have attended a Koran school also is
clearly higher among the younger Muslims in Germany than among those who are older
(112). Interestingly, the number is highest among those born in Germany: 60%. The
longer that attendance at a Koran school lasted, the more clearly a religiously
fundamentalist orientation can be observed (134) – which likewise cannot be surprising
when seen against the background of the results of earlier studies on the integration-inhibiting
role played by Koran schools.2
The study explicitly and rightly emphasizes that a religiously orthodox, old-fashioned
traditional, or fundamentalist orientation may not be equated rashly with the willingness to
commit violence or with extremism. Islam does not in any way teach terrorism as a goal of
faith, and whoever prays five times a day is in no way closer to violence and extremism than
the non-religious person. Whoever adheres to religious rites and convictions in a, to a large
extent, secular society may appear suspicious to some – but, by no stretch of the imagination
can he or she be termed a terrorist on this basis. In order to slide from a strict religious belief
into extremism, further motivating elements, attitudes, and developments (most Muslims
would say: wrong developments) are necessary so that, in the end, a person believing in Islam
becomes an advocate of struggle and violence against the “infidels”. In this area, too, that is,
in the explanation of the necessary differences between a believer and an extremist, the study
makes a valuable contribution.
1. The Muslim Resident Population
The answers from about 1000 persons were analyzed after a telephone survey; not
quite a third possessed German citizenship (192). But, only 12.2% defined themselves as
Germans (193). The average educational level of those surveyed was rather low: almost 70%
possessed a secondary school diploma or less; but only about 12% were academics (192,
193).
Integration
Of the respondents, 19.4% can be considered as poorly integrated linguistically and
socially, a further 37.6% as moderately integrated, only 32% as satisfactorily to well
integrated, and 11.9% as very well integrated (96), dependent upon the age of the person at
the time of immigration: “A successful integration, put into practice in everyday life, can be
identified only in somewhat more than 10%” (103) – in this clarity, a conclusion that must
give pause for serious thought and call for nothing short of political action. To be sure,
2
Wolfgang Ritsch, for example, came to this result as early as 1987: Die Rolle des Islams für die
Koranschulerziehung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Hochschulschriften 244, (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein,
1987).
3
segregation and isolation are rejected by the overwhelming majority of over 80%, but the
neglect of one’s own culture is likewise also rejected (99). The willingness to integrate, of
course, exists, but it goes hand in hand with the necessity for retaining one’s own culture.
Nearly half of the Muslim resident population, for its part, feels rejected by the German
population (109).
Disparagement and the Readiness to Resort to Violence
Almost 90% are “infuriated” “when after terrorist attacks Muslims are always
suspected first” (108); they feel themselves as Muslims collectively and globally
marginalized. More than 90% reject the killing of other people in the name of God as
unjustifiable, and more than 90% consider a person who “encourages young Muslims to
commit suicide attacks or instructs them in doing so” to be “godless criminals” (177). On
the other hand, 44% agreed “somewhat” or “completely” with the statement that
“Muslims who die in armed struggle for the faith” enter “into Paradise”, that is, are
rewarded by God for their acts (176). Just under 40% consider “the use of physical
violence as a reaction to the threat presented to Islam by the West as legitimate” (191).
Religion and Religious Freedom
Almost 87% characterize themselves as personally religious or very religious, whereby
the level of devotion increases at a lower level of schooling (112). About 40% of the Muslim
resident population can be considered as “fundamentalist oriented” (195): 79.6% agreed
“completely” with the statement that the Koran is the true revelation of God; a further
9.4% agreed “somewhat”; together 89% (116). The daily regard for religion also goes hand
in hand with the high proportion of those who are convinced of the truth of their religion; the
rites and commandments of Islam are held in high esteem, even when they are not always
observed in detail (117).
Although it is evident in this segment of the population, as well as also in all others,
how highly religious freedom is esteemed in Germany, around 30% agree “completely” or
“somewhat” that it should be forbidden to persuade Muslims to change their religion
(118) – which would mean a restriction upon the public presentation of other religions and,
thus, a restriction upon religious freedom. Forty-five percent agreed “completely” or
“somewhat” that “only Islam is able to solve the problems of out time” (119). Further, 48.4%
“affirm the statement that democracy in Germany is one of the reasons for the high rate of
crime” (141); 46.7% agree “somewhat” or “completely” that “the observance of the
commandments of my religion … (is) more important for me than democracy” (141), which
corresponds roughly to the results of earlier surveys that about half of the Muslim population
in Germany considers the Koran and democracy to be incompatible. Further, 33.6% advocate
the death penalty, and about 9.4% advocate the punishments contained in Sharia for
Germany (141) – which in absolute figures corresponds to more than 300,000 people.
Radicalisms
With attendance at a Koran school, the consumption (exclusively) of non-German
media, as well as the exclusive participation in Islamic associations, the distance to
democracy and the distance to the rule of law increase considerably (167, 173), a
development which is discernible among about 10% of Muslims as a whole and is the higher
the less the linguistic-practical integration has been successful (173). The distance to
4
democracy is greatest among the extremely religious (fundamentalist oriented), but in this
group applies only to a hard core of about 15% (173).
Especially susceptible to radicalisms appears, first of all, to be especially well-
educated groups that, to be sure, themselves have had little experience of discrimination
in Germany, but assume such for “the Muslims” globally. The second group of those in
danger of radicalization is composed of people with little education and an active
experience of discrimination; the third group includes people with a traditional religious
orientation – In consequence, it can be said that an individual’s lack of participation in
society, or that person’s marginalization, is certainly a problem, but for only a part of
Muslims is it a cause for a possible radicalization (166).
Adding the group of those maintaining a great distance to democracy to those
who to a great degree consider religiously and politically motivated violence to be
legitimate, the study assumes a proportion amounting altogether to 13.9% of the
Muslims in Germany (185), an “absolutely substantial minority with a problematic attitude
toward violence and/or democracy and the rule of law” (185) that shows a clear potential for
radicalization. “Only a small minority of 6% displays a high acceptance of politically and
religiously motivated violence” (190).
A sound education is thus a factor that makes a development toward
radicalization more unlikely, but does not exclude it, which is shown by the group of those
with a higher level of education but with a stronger rejection of the Western way of life and
the Western social order – for this reason, it is correct to emphasize the significance of
education since, in the segment with a greater level of education, a smaller proportion
approves of religiously and politically motivated violence, but, on the other hand, it is shown
empirically here that radicalism is not to be combated with education alone, since a
portion of educated persons also is found among those who advocate politically and
religiously motivated violence.
“On the whole, the results of this survey lead to the conclusion that, in the Muslim
resident population, a relevant potential on the level of personal attitudes exists that can be
suitable as a ground of resonance and a field of recruitment for radicalisms and
extremisms” (201).
2. Students of the Ninth and Tenth Grades
About 500 Muslim youth from various types of schools in Cologne, Augsburg, and
Hamburg were surveyed by written questionnaire together with non-Muslim youth so that a
comparison could be drawn between the various educational segments, but also between
Muslim and non-Muslim migrants as well as native non-Muslims.
Just about 40% of the Muslim students surveyed possessed German citizenship (212);
about 70% came from a Turkish background (213); 77% lived since birth in Germany
(214). Yet, here, too, a high proportion, 27.2%, felt themselves bound only to their home
country (219), which for most of them is the country of origin of their parents and
grandparents. Definite tendencies toward segregation from the majority society are discernible
in a third of the young people (265). Just over 10% express themselves affirmatively in
regard to the legitimacy of corporal punishment in Germany also (267), 14.2% are
assessed as critical of democracy (272), while, in comparison, 10.5% of German non-Muslims
hold the same view (337).
5
Radicalisms
More than 15% of Muslim young people express anti-Semitic prejudices (275); to
a clearly lesser extent, however, prejudices against Christians. Among native non-Muslims,
however, the proportion of those who express prejudices against Muslims is, at almost a
fifth of those surveyed, still higher. Only 6.4% of Muslim youth is considered to be
sympathetic toward Islamism (295), but 24% are considered sympathetic toward
violence (310) – in contrast to 14.9% of native youth: “In sum, it therefore can be
established that a significantly heightened acceptance of violence is connected with the
affiliation with the Islamic religion” (312). Among non-Muslims (Christians), a contrary
tendency is discernible: a heightened religious consciousness lowers the affinity toward
violence to about 3% (315, 319).
Intolerance and Dissociation From Democracy
A great distance from democracy and the rule of law is evinced by 11.6% (306). “If
strong anti-Semitic or antichristian prejudices and/or great distance from democracy are
taken together as characteristics that define a group at risk, then, on the basis of the data in
hand, one can discern such problems for almost a quarter of young Muslims (23.8%). It is a
matter here of a minority that is not to be underestimated and that shows clear indications of
intolerance, distance to democracy, or authoritarian features” (308). If the aspect of the
advocacy of violence is combined with this figure, then the percentage rises to 29.2% (341),
more than a quarter of Muslim young people – a potential that is not insignificant and is not to
be neglected.
Whoever maintains his or her distance to democracy, entertains religious prejudices,
and is intolerant tends rather to advocate violence (339). Approximately a fourth of the
young people affirms its own readiness to exert corporal violence against unbelievers in
the service of the Islamic community (339). As a whole, this percentage of young people is
approximately twice as high as the percentage in the total Islamic population; “among the
young people, the potential of young Muslims responsive to political radicalization up to the
extent of excessive violence (is) noticeably higher than in the general population” (321),
especially among poorly educated young men with experience of discrimination and a
fundamentalist religious orientation (327). A religious orientation alone, or poor social
conditions, or the lack of educational opportunities, however, are in no way responsible for
the advocacy of violence. Parental experiences with violence, the traditional perception of
roles, and notions of masculinity play a greater role here (330).
The Significance of Religion
The percentage of young people who characterize themselves as religious is
87.2% (this percentage is somewhat higher than in the general population). Of these, 44.2%
can be characterized as fundamentalist oriented, for whom religion is of great significance in
daily life and who emphasize a faithful, rigid observance of the Koranic commandments
(262). In contrast, 45.6% of non-Muslim migrants describe themselves as religious; only
19.1% of native young people do so (242). Among Muslim youth, this heightened
religiousness is a concomitant of less education and a correlative longer attendance at a Koran
school, the result of which is a more intense fundamentalist orientation. Among native young
people, an increased religiousness is, conversely, a concomitant of a higher education (246,
262).
6
Education and Exclusion
Striking is the fact that the educational level of Muslim youth (rate of attendance
at a Gymnasium: 14.6%) is significantly lower than among native young people (45.8%),
but also lower than among non-Muslim migrants (34.1%). Among Muslims, 63.3%
reported that they had “only a few” or “no German friends at all”; among non-Muslim
migrants, this was the case for only 47.1% (220).
The linguistic-practical integration of Muslim youth was significantly less than
that of non-Muslim youth; more than 40% have problems here (223, 224). Only 45.4%
of young Muslims advocate the adaptation of their conduct to German culture and
instead demand acceptance; in the general Muslim population, on the other hand, 82.6%
advocates adaptation (225). In consequence, young Muslims insist more strongly than non-
Muslims upon the maintenance of their own culture. At the same time, however, 35.9%
judges the German society receiving them as migrants as having a negative attitude toward
them; almost 80% report of incidents of rejection and negative treatment in the last twelve
months (241).
Apart from the clearly discernible distance maintained by many Muslim young people
toward German society is the fact that between 14.3% and 19.5% of native youth display
extremely xenophobic attitudes. The claim of a fundamental superiority of Germans over
other peoples is agreed to “somewhat” or “completely” by 15.3% (231); 43.4% have the
opinion that “most foreigners are criminals” (231). Among native German youth, 17.1%
encounter Muslims with intolerance and prejudice, and advocate violence (233); almost 50%
support the idea that foreigners who are unable or unwilling to accommodate
themselves should leave Germany (235) – here lies a considerable potential for conflict.
3. University Students
From a survey of a total of more than 1000 university students in Hamburg, Augsburg,
and Cologne, as well as the Charité in Berlin, just under 200 Muslim university students were
extracted as a third group for analysis. The overwhelming majority of the Muslims surveyed
here, too, came from a Turkish background; all those surveyed had studied for at last six
semesters.
Among the students, too, the culture of origin and the relationship and commitment to
one’s own roots played a large role, for in this segment of the population, too, it is
emphasized among more than half of the students that the maintenance of one’s native
culture, in spite of the – likewise extant – willingness to accommodate, is at the same time
important (417). Only 10% express a “primary cultural identification with
Germany” (363). From this, it can be concluded that the question of commitment to and
identification with the receiving society is not one of education. Those who are best integrated
can be seen as those who came to Germany already as children or young people (357). On the
whole, the rate of those who linguistically and socially are well or very well integrated
among the students is 78.9% (358).
Discriminations
Remarkable is the high percentage of Muslim students who mention rejection and
discrimination: More than 60% of Muslim students declare that, as foreigners, they
7
already have been given “funny looks”; only a little more than 40% of non-Muslims
report this. More than 50% of Muslim students also cite discrimination from the police
or administrative agencies, which they attribute to the fact that they are foreigners,
while only about a third of non-Muslims see this so (365). Among Muslim students, 33.7%
report severe or very severe discrimination, a rate that is considerably lower among non-
Muslim students. Here, thus, it is obvious that certain incidents are interpreted by Muslims
differently than by non-Muslims, which can be substantiated clearly through the high rate of
agreement with a globally-felt marginalization of Muslims.
Here, one can recognize a clear connection between linguistic-practical integration and
the magnitude of personally-felt slights – the experience of victimization (367). Among
Muslim students, 43.2% feel rejected by the German population (369), and almost 83%
personally feel “rage” in response to the immediate suspicion of Muslims in regard to
terror attacks (371), which means a broad dissemination of the perception of collective
marginalization.
Religion and Democracy
Religion has great importance among students, also. Of them, 76.7% describe
themselves as religious; of these, just under 20% are very religious (373). More than two
thirds consider the Koran to be the true revelation of God (377). Here, too, religious
orthodoxy or traditionalism is not to be equated with extremism or the readiness to resort to
violence (402).
In comparison with the general resident population, the proportion of the
fundamentalist oriented – who, in correlation, show considerably lower levels of integration
as well as report higher rates of personally-experienced discrimination (388) – is above all
considerably lower among students, and the proportion of the moderately religious, at just
under 35%, is relatively higher (383). Nevertheless, 17.8% state that the religious
commandments in the Koran would have greater importance to them than democracy,
and about a third expressed themselves positively in a general way in regard to Sharia in
Germany, while, however, only 7% expressed unequivocal agreement (389). On the whole,
8.2% within the group of students are classed as “highly distant toward democracy” (390),
and 9.4% express anti-Semitic prejudices (non-Muslims with a migration background: 4.9%)
(394). The tendency toward authoritarian-Islamist, anti-Semitic, antichristian, and
democracy-distant attitudes among Muslim students is, at 14.9%, on the whole definitely
less than among high school students (23.8%) (403), but is still a significant minority.
Along with the approximately 6% of students with a sympathy for Islamism, there
exists a further quarter of students who are rigidly religious and declare a moderate distance to
democracy combined with a general affirmation of Sharia. Here, the willingness to
accommodate can be termed rather low, and the tendencies toward isolation are rather strong,
so that here, against the background of a strong perception of the marginalization of the
Muslim community and concretely experienced discrimination, the ground for radicalization
can be prepared easily (404). This critical potential among the students who are subject to
a latent danger of radicalization is estimated by the authors of the study to be of the
magnitude of roughly 30% when the advocacy of Sharia, a distance to democracy,
religious prejudices, and a rigid alignment on religion are included as compromising
factors (404, 405).
8
Religiously and politically motivated violence is also cited much less frequently by the
students than on average in the Muslim population and is rejected by more than 80%. On the
whole, Muslim and non-Muslim students do not differ from each other significantly (415). In
general, it appears that it is the globally marginalized and oppressed position of Muslims
observed in foreign countries worldwide that comes into question as a factor for possible
radicalization rather than the personal experience of discrimination in Germany (416).
“Thus, also among the highly educated Muslims, as which students here must be
regarded, a high-risk group quite definitely can be more exactly located. Significant here –
along with a religious alignment in a form that bears in itself a strong devaluation of the
West and a wholesale upgrading of the value of Islam – is the intensive confrontation with
the position of Muslims in the world and the subjective perception of their discrimination
and oppression.” (420)
4. Activists in Islamic Associations and Organizations
As a fourth group, functionaries or activists in Islamic associations, mosques, and
organizations, as well their members, users, and those persons from their immediate
environment closely connected with them, were surveyed. Altogether, 60 male Muslims –
academics as well as non-academics – between the ages of 25 and 55 in the Hamburg area
were surveyed in personal interviews. In carrying out the interviews, a considerable effort was
necessary in order to dispel the misgivings of those interviewed about a possible
“eavesdropping” or “infiltration” of the associations, or also about the collection of data about
persons in the associations for use by the security agencies.
Here, too, the interview partners with a Turkish background were in the majority;
more than half the interview partners held German citizenship. The participants in the
interviews were without exception very religious (456); a portion expressed a strong
deprecation of Western societies (459), which were judged as morally depraved and two-
faced (466). The themes of global marginalization and oppression of Muslims assumes an
immensely important role in these interviews (486).
Exclusion
The esteem for freedom and basic rights, such as the freedom of religion and the rule
of law in Germany, were emphasized frequently. At the same time, all those interviewed
remarked that they, as Muslims, felt excluded and discriminated against in Germany and felt a
strong solidarity with the worldwide situation of Muslims, which they characterized very
emphatically as victims. Those interviewed complained that Islam in Germany is
discriminated against in comparison with Christianity, that is, that Islam is not treated as a
religion of equal status, so that Muslims in the workplace are limited in the practice of their
religion – whereby this state of affairs always was reported as applying to others, but no
impediment, for example, to prayer, was cited from personal experience (443, 444). As
evidence that Islam is discriminated against, limitations in the construction of mosques were
cited. State sponsorship and support of the construction of mosques, on the other hand,
would be acknowledged as a symbol of the equal recognition of Muslims in society (445).
Striking were the frequently exaggerated reports about a climate of prejudices,
hostilities, rejection, and discriminations against Muslims in Germany: “The descriptions
are to a great extent interspersed with the locution of Muslims as ‘victims’ expressed with the
most varied nuances … To be sure, this is substantiated to a certain extent with references to
9
details, which, however, in very few cases are attributed to direct personal experience.
Dominant is the description of the situation of others who one personally knows and about
which one knows” (441) or descriptions that show a strong distortion of the truth: “I am
treated here and looked upon as though I am a terrorist (as though one is a constant threat)
only because I come to prayer” (484). Only through the supposed treatment of Muslims as
terrorists in Germany, so the respondents, does aggression among Muslims arise:
“There is such an effort to discriminate [against Muslim women], that almost nothing any
more can be done with a headscarf … thus, one becomes aggressive” (484) – here, the
German society, because of its exclusion of Muslims, is considered the cause of violence.
Integration
In reaction, older persons appear rather to withdraw from German society, while
younger persons, as self-assured Muslims in Germany, demand that they be given
recognition (489), and have the vision of forming a kind of political or even economic
avant-garde. It is strongly emphasized by several, especially younger interview partners that
the Muslim community expects to be recognized by the receiving society just as they are
(485). Integration is considered to be a two-sided process and also as a debt to be paid by
the majority society: 91.6% of those surveyed advocate free German courses for
migrants (448). Up to the present, the feeling of not really belonging has been dominant,
even if German citizenship was acquired (450). Coldness, distance, and isolation are
mentioned frequently as characteristics of German society, which, so the respondents,
when all is said and done, would not acknowledge the migrants as their own – whatever the
migrants might be willing to do – and would demand assimilation (485). On the other hand,
the personal places of refuge, the mosque associations, and cultural organizations are named
critically by a portion of those surveyed as an obstacle to integration (454).
Extremism and Personal Liberties
A striking feature of the interviews was the frequently expressed complaint about the
constantly demanded separation and dissociation from “hate preachers” and extremists.
Muslim associations and mosques have “developed a distinct feeling … of being increasingly
in the focus of observation and always being exposed to the danger of being placed under the
suspicion of Islamism and of struggling against democratic structures” (426). In the
interviews, the opinion also was expressed that through its rejection of Muslims, German
society hinders their integration, reception into the society, and complete cultural
acceptance (478).
In the course of the survey, an ambivalent relationship to personal liberties in
Germany frequently came to light: on the one hand, a resort to personal liberties for the
purpose of asserting one’s own point of view (for example, the assertion of religious
instruction in one’s own religious orientation as the only correct one), which at the same
time is then rejected when positions deviating from one’s own views are at issue (for
example, religious instruction in other Muslim branches of faith) (480), or in the case of
marriage with non-Muslim partners: for sons barely accepted, but for daughters apodictically
rejected (481). Here, the expectation that the German state should introduce special
rights for Muslims also is formulated, as, for example, state promotion of and respect for
Islamic holidays or the application of Islamic law for the Islamic faith community
through the creation of a parallel legal society (481) – here, the rule of law as the principle
of legal sovereignty applying equally to the Muslim faith community is clearly rejected.
About one of the interview partners, it is said that “An accommodation of his conduct, or the
10
conduct of other Muslims, to the rules of the receiving German society is, in his eyes, an
unacceptable imposition” (482)
The existence of hate preachers and mosques in which extremism is preached is
conceded, but is judged critically as far as is possible. They are considered as a problem
and as doing harm to Muslims as a whole (462). The reaction of German society to the
extremist threat, however, is judged at the same time as discriminatory, exaggerated,
and, in the last analysis – for example, through identity checks in or before mosques – as
aggravating the threat (468). Muslims, it is believed, are “construed falsely by politics
internationally as a threatening factor” (473), whereby a third of those surveyed considers
the concern with extremism as out of place, a third as justified but highly exaggerated in
individual perception, and a third as justified.
Religiously and politically motivated violence is almost never openly promoted or
approved. On the other hand, a radicalization through a many times greater distance to
democracy, clear tendencies toward isolation, the often affirmed judgement of the Sharia as
superior to the Basic Law, the in part openly conceded dissociation from the rule of law, and
the demand for the limitation of the personal liberties of others (such as one’s own daughters
or wife) appears easily conceivable in this environment.
Finally, with the help of four individual biographical reports, it becomes clear how
processes of radicalization can come to pass in Germany: One cause can be a kind of
“awakening experience” through which earlier religious training is revived in a period in
which there is a lack of orientation and deep uncertainty and in which Islam is now
implemented in a comprehensive and rigid manner. Another way is the gradual entry into a
tradition of “true Islam” or of a stricter religious observance than usual in the parents’
home. This occurs frequently in a mosque or learning environment in which separation and
the superiority of the Sharia over Western values are preached. After this change in the
previously average religious person, a significantly heightened degree of religious rigidity and
depreciation of other Muslims who do not live consistently according to the rules of Islam is
reached that then quickly extends to complete dissociation from Western society and the
acceptance of violence in defence of religion or honor, as well as to the limitation of personal
liberties (for example, among the women in one’s own family) or to the struggle against
unbelief (471). If religious intolerance and strict orientation on rules combines with distance
to democracy and subjection to the authority of religious leaders who demand a rigid and also
a political implementation of Islam, then processes of radicalization can begin that end in the
turn to Islamism and in the willingness to use violence (477).
Summary
In the sum of the study, the great significance of religion for all Muslims in
Germany is striking, as well as the high percentage of those who confess their religion in
theory and practice. Fundamentalist religious orientations, however, are not synonymous
with distance to democracy, and distance to democracy is not automatically a sign of the
willingness to commit violence; other factors must be added here. It is, however, certainly the
case that the seed of radicalism can be sown more easily in this ground of the basically aloof
view of the Western way of life and society, a view that can change into extremism against
the background of personally experienced marginalization or the sense of the worldwide
oppression of Muslims. For this reason, the potential for danger is considerably greater than
the modest membership figures in the known Islamic-extremist associations might suggest.
11
Because of the manifold factors that can bring about a radicalization of
individuals, this latent potential for a politically and religiously motivated radicalization
in Germany, as the study emphasizes, can not be quantified clearly. The authors,
however, on the basis of the present investigation, assume a figure of approximately
10% to 12% of the Muslims in Germany (494), which means a number on the
magnitude of between 320,000 and 420,000 people.
Decisive for radicalization are, essentially, three different paths: For the first
path, the experience of a personal exclusion is less decisive than the vicarious sense of being
the victim of a global oppression and of finding one’s system of reference outside Western
society (in Sharia or in the umma, the Muslim world community), the notion of an
“exclusion, deprecation, and oppression of Muslims on a national as well as international
level” (494), for “In sum, a quite considerable portion of the Muslims living in Germany,
students as well as the general Muslim population, is convinced that the community of
Muslims in the global sense is discriminated against and treated poorly” (418). The second
group is basically willing to accommodate, but experiences personal rejection while at
the same time having few chances for participation in society because of a low level of
education. The third group is rather traditional in its religious orientation and of itself
withdraws from society without wanting to participate (494).
The potential for an affinity to violence among Muslims in Germany can be
quantified as just under 6%. If a great distance to democracy and a rejection of the rule
of law are added, then a figure of about 14% of the Muslims within the survey is
reached. By projection of this result upon the entire Muslim population in Germany,
and in consideration of possible sources of error, this percentage can lie between 11.9%
and 16.4% (495). The study concludes:
“Fundamentalist orientations that combine a close religious attachment, a high
relevance of religion in daily life, and a strong orientation on religious rules and rituals with
a tendency to exclude Muslims who do not observe these, as well as with the tendency
generally to heighten the value of Islam and to derogate Western, Christian-influenced
cultures, show an enormous dissemination. In the general population, about 40% are to be
assigned to such a pattern of orientation” (493)
Language acquisition and education, as well as social participation and the reduction
of prejudices, especially those prejudices held by non-Muslim youth toward Muslims, are thus
important social and political goals necessary for counteracting tendencies toward
radicalization in the Muslim community. However, they do not form the one, comprehensive
solution, since there are other elements in the process of radicalization – such as the perceived
worldwide victimization of Muslims, or a political and rigid instruction in Islam through a
religious authority. In any case, a fundamental potential for recruitment is found among
Muslim youth and young adults, and not among those who are older (501). For this
reason, it is important to the authors of the study that the dialogue be conducted openly, but
not indifferently.
“It seems to be the case that this search for meaning and the struggle for values
requires a dialogue and credible dialogue partners who, on the one hand, do not dismiss
Islam, and also do not encounter it with an arbitrary attitude, but rather themselves are
strong dialogue partners standing upon a solid foundation” (501)
L'Europe résistera-t-elle à l'islamisation ?
par Daniel Pipes
Jerusalem Post
3 avril 2008
En Europe occidentale certains analystes de l'Islam affirment que le continent ne peut plus échapper à son destin eurabique, que la tendance amorcée au cours du dernier demi-siècle va se poursuivre jusqu'à que les Musulmans y deviennent une population majoritaire et qu'y règne la loi islamique (la charia).
Je conteste cette vision des choses en montrant que le continent pourrait prendre une autre voie, celle de la résistance à l'islamisation et de la réaffirmation de ses traditions. Les Européens de souche – qui forment jusqu'à 95% de la population – peuvent fort bien exiger le maintien de leurs coutumes et de leurs mœurs historiques. S'ils le décident, rien ne saurait les en empêcher.
Et en effet, les Européens montrent des signes d'impatience face à la progression rampante de la charia. En France, la législation interdisant le hijab dans les classes des écoles publiques révèle bien les réticences des Européens à accepter les usages islamiques, de même que les efforts visant à interdire la burqa, les mosquées et les minarets. Les partis anti-immigrants voient leur popularité augmenter partout en Europe occidentale.
Cette résistance a pris un aspect nouveau depuis la semaine passée, à la suite de deux événements spectaculaires. D'abord, le 22 mars, le pape Benoît XVI en personne a donné le baptême, la confirmation et l'eucharistie à Magdi Allam, 56 ans, un Égyptien musulman de naissance vivant depuis longtemps en Italie, où il est l'un des principaux rédacteurs du grand quotidien Corriere della Sera et un auteur bien connu. Allam a pris Cristiano comme deuxième prénom. La cérémonie de sa conversion à la foi catholique ne pouvait pas avoir plus de lustre: elle s'est tenue pendant une célébration de la veillée pascale à la Basilique de Saint-Pierre, avec une couverture complète du Vatican et de nombreuses autres chaînes de télévision.
Allam ponctua sa conversion par une déclaration acerbe dans laquelle il affirme notamment «qu'au delà du phénomène de l'extrémisme et du terrorisme islamistes sur le plan mondial, les racines du mal sont inhérentes à un islam physiologiquement violent et historiquement conflictuel». En d'autres termes, le problème n'est pas simplement l'islamisme, mais l'Islam lui-même. Un commentateur, «Spengler», d'Asia Times, va jusqu'à dire qu'Allam «représente une menace existentielle pour la vie musulmane» parce qu'il «rejoint ses anciens coreligionnaires dans leur rejet de la culture dégradante de l'Occident moderne et leur offre quelque chose de tout différent: une religion fondée sur l'amour».
Ensuite, le 27 mars, Geert Wilders, 44 ans, présenta son court-métrage de 15 minutes très attendu, Fitna, constitué de certains des versets les plus belliqueux du Coran suivis d'actes respectant ces versets et commis par des islamistes ces dernières années. Le message évident est que les islamistes agissent en accord avec leurs écritures. Pour reprendre les termes d'Allam, Wilders affirme donc également que «les racines du mal sont inhérentes » à l'Islam.
Contrairement à Allam et Wilders, je fais la distinction entre l'Islam et l'islamisme, mais je pense qu'il est indispensable que leurs idées puissent être entendues, sans vitupérations ni punitions. Un débat honnête doit pouvoir s'instaurer sur le thème de l'Islam.
Si la conversion d'Allam a été une surprise, le film de Wilders était annoncé et attendu depuis trois mois, mais dans les deux cas, les réactions agressives et violentes qui ont répondu à des critiques précédentes de l'Islam ne sont pas intervenues. Selon le Los Angeles Times, la police hollandaise a contacté les imams pour évaluer les réactions dans les mosquées de la ville et ont indiqué que «les choses sont plus calmes que d'ordinaire aujourd'hui. Un peu comme lors d'une célébration.» Au Pakistan, un ralliement contre le film n'a réuni que quelques douzaines de protestataires.
Cette réaction relativement retenue indique que les menaces musulmanes suffisent à imposer la censure. Ainsi, le Premier ministre des Pays-Bas, Jan Peter Balkenende, dénonça Fitna et, après que 3,6 millions visiteurs l'aient vu sur le site web britannique LiveLeak.com, la société annonça qu'«à la suite de menaces très sérieuses, (…) nous sommes contraints de supprimer Fitna de nos serveurs» (mais LiveLeak a remis le film en ligne deux jours tard).
Trois similarités méritent d'être relevées: tant Allam (auteur d'un livre intitulé Viva Israele) que Wilders (dont le film met en exergue la violence des Musulmans contre les Juifs) soutiennent Israël et les Juifs; les menaces musulmanes contre leur vie les ont obligés tous deux à vivre sous une protection policière permanente fournie par l'État; et, à un niveau plus profond, ils partagent une passion pour la civilisation européenne.
En fait, Allam et Wilders pourraient bien représenter l'avant-garde d'une réaffirmation chrétienne et libérale des valeurs européennes. Il est trop tôt pour émettre des pronostics, mais ces hommes dévoués pourraient donner une impulsion décisive pour le maintien de l'identité historique du continent.
L’« islamophobie » et le jihad idéologique moderne
Que font les Musulmans modérés des preuves indubitables que les terroristes jihadistes oeuvrent bien dans le cadre des traditions islamiques classiques et se basent sur le Coran et sur l’exemple de Mahomet pour exhorter leurs coreligionnaires à combattre les infidèles ? Ont-il explicitement et définitivement rejeté les enseignements des jihadistes comme incompatibles avec l’Islam du XXe siècle ? Ont-ils confronté et réfuté l’exégèse jihadiste du Coran et de la Sunna ? Ont-ils présenté une vision alternative de l’Islam suffisamment convaincante pour rivaliser avec « le pur Islam » des jihadistes dans la lutte mondiale pour emporter l’opinion des Musulmans ?
De manière générale, la réponse à toutes ces questions est non. Au lieu de cela, les Musulmans « modérés » ont inventé l’ « islamophobie ».
Aux Nations Unies: un nouveau mot, un nouvel outil de manipulation politique
Jusqu’il y a quelques années, personne n’avait entendu parler d’ « islamophobie ». Mais une année, c’est beaucoup pour une machine de propagande bien rôdée. À l’heure actuelle, ce concept – vague et somme toute creux – est pris au sérieux aux plus hauts niveaux. En décembre 2004, Kofi Annan présida un séminaire onusien consacré à l’ « islamophobie », expliquant avec la plus grande gravité et la plus grande rectitude morale : « (…) lorsque l’on est contraint de forger un néologisme pour décrire la généralisation constante d’un préjugé, c’est d’une évolution bien troublante, bien attristante, qu’il s’agit de rendre compte. C’est ce qui se passe avec l’islamophobie. Le mot est apparu semble-t-il à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990, mais le phénomène lui-même existait depuis des siècles. Le poids de l’histoire et les répercussions des événements récents font qu’aujourd’hui beaucoup de musulmans se sentent blessés et incompris, qu’ils s’inquiètent de voir rogner leurs droits et qu’ils craignent même pour leur personne (…) »[1].
Sans surprise, l’attention de l’ONU resta principalement concentrée sur ces Musulmans blessés et incompris, sans que la question des racines islamiques du terrorisme jihadiste soit évoquée ; sans qu’il y eut non plus de débat quant à la compatibilité de l’Islam avec l’idée mondialement acceptée des droits de l’homme, incarnés par la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme de 1948, des Nations Unies elles-mêmes.
La Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme : réactions islamiques
Nous avons déjà vu que le cheik iranien Tabandeh rédigea une critique islamique de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme. Le monde islamique a cru bon de formuler deux réponses majeures au document de l’ONU : La « Déclaration Islamique Universelle des Droits de l’Homme » en 1981, et la « Déclaration du Caire sur les Droits de l’Homme en Islam » en 1990. L’article 18 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, que nous devons au courageux libanais Charles Malik, stipule que « Toute personne a droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion ; ce droit implique la liberté de changer de religion ou de conviction (…)»[2].
Vous ne trouverez de garantie analogue quant à la liberté de changer de religion dans aucune des deux chartes islamiques; en effet, comme nous l’avons vu, la loi traditionnelle islamique requiert la peine de mort contre ceux qui quittent l’Islam. Qui plus est, la Déclaration du Caire précise : « Tout homme a le droit d’exprimer librement son opinion pourvu qu’elle ne soit pas en contradiction avec les principes de la Charia ; Tout homme a le droit d’ordonner le bien et de proscrire le mal, conformément aux préceptes de la Charia (…) »[3].
En se penchant sur l’ « islamophobie » plutôt que sur certaines réalités déplaisantes de l’Islam, l’ONU déshonore les victimes passées et présentes du jihad, et se montre de connivence avec les terroristes. Bien que cette position soit le résultat d’une attitude politiquement correcte et d’un prétendu souci d’éviter que d’innocents Musulmans aient à souffrir de diffamation, elle nuit en réalité aux efforts que fournissent certains Musulmans et non-Musulmans pour examiner les sources réelles de la terreur jihadiste et pour trouver des moyens d’éloigner les Musulmans du chemin de la violence.
Qu’est-ce que l’islamophobie, de toute façon?
Le journaliste et apologiste de l’Islam Stephen Schwartz défini ainsi l’ « islamophobie »:
En dépit de ce que disent certains occidentaux, l’islamophobie existe ; ce n’est pas un mythe. L’islamophobie consiste à …
- s’attaquer à la religion islamique toute entière, considérée comme un problème pour le monde ;
- condamner tout l’Islam et son histoire comme extrémiste ;
- nier l’existence active, dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, d’une majorité musulmane modérée ;
- insister sur le fait que les Musulmans doivent céder aux requêtes (fondées sur l’ignorance et l’arrogance) des non-Musulmans et faire subir certaines modifications théologiques à leur religion ;
- traiter tout conflit impliquant des Musulmans (comme, par exemple, en Bosnie-Herzégovine il y a une dizaine d’années) comme causé par les Musulmans eux-mêmes;
- inciter à la guerre contre l’Islam dans son ensemble.[4]
Bien qu’il puisse exister un certain nombre d’islamophobes dans le monde suivant cette définition, Schwartz embrouille les choses plus qu’il ne les clarifie. Qualifier d’« islamophobe » le fait « de s’attaquer à la religion islamique toute entière, considérée comme un problème pour le monde » signifie-t-il qu’il est également « islamophobe » d’attirer l’attention sur le fait que le Coran et la Sunna du prophète servent de motivation aux activités terroristes ? Si c’est le cas, les jihadistes de par le monde sont eux-mêmes « islamophobes », puisque, comme nous l’avons vu, ils relèvent systématiquement les passages jihadistes du Coran et de la Sunna pour justifier leurs actes. Et discuter clairement de la doctrine du jihad islamique ne revient pas à dire que « la religion islamique toute entière » est « un problème pour le monde ». Personne n’affirme que le tayammum (ablutions au moyen de sable plutôt que d’eau) ou le dhikr (pratique rituelle des derviches notamment) ou encore d’autres éléments de l’Islam posent problème au monde.
Qualifier la condamnation de « tout l’Islam et son histoire comme extrémiste » comme « islamophobe » est tout aussi problématique – et pas seulement du fait de l’imprécision du terme « extrémiste ». Le jihad et la dhimmitude font partie de l’Islam. Mais aucun commandement d’aucune religion n’a jamais été observé uniformément par tous les croyants, ni aucune loi universellement appliquée ; les Juifs et les Chrétiens vivant en territoire islamique ont parfois connu, en différentes époques et différents lieux, un grand degré de liberté. Cependant, cela n’invalide pas le fait que les lois de la dhimma restèrent toujours dans les textes, prêtes à être appliquées par tout dirigeant musulman.
De même, alors qu’il peut sembler « islamophobe » de « nier l’existence active, dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, d’une majorité musulmane modérée », cela n’est en rien pertinent. Qu’une majorité musulmane modérée existe ou non dépend ce que vous entendez par « modérée ». Cela désigne-t-il quelqu’un qui ne prendrait jamais part à un acte de terrorisme ? Cela rendrait modérés une écrasante majorité des Musulmans de la planète. Ou le « modéré » est-il celui qui réprouve sincèrement ces actes de terrorisme ? Cela réduirait le nombre des modérés. Ou un Musulman « modéré » est-il quelqu’un qui s’élève ouvertement contre ces actes et travaille énergiquement à contrer les jihadistes ? Cela ferait encore baisser ce nombre. Ou, enfin, un Musulman « modéré » est-il quelqu’un qui affronte résolument les jihadistes, dans une lutte théologique, pour tenter de convaincre ses coreligionnaires, sur des bases islamiques, que le terrorisme est mauvais ? Il ne nous resterait plus alors qu’une minuscule poignée de modérés.
Enfin, il serait stupide de la part de quiconque de « traiter tout conflit impliquant des Musulmans (…) comme causé par les Musulmans eux-mêmes » ou d’ « inciter à la guerre contre l’Islam dans son ensemble ». Entrer en guerre avec l’Islam dans son ensemble – depuis les bergers grisonnants du Kazakhstan jusqu’à Ben Laden et Zarqawi en passant par les joviales secrétaires de Jakarta – serait absurde et inutile. Mais que veut réellement dire Schwartz lorsqu’il explique que ceux qui préconisent la « guerre contre l’Islam dans son ensemble » sont « islamophobes » ? Y inclut-il ceux qui ont compris qu’un jihad islamique a été déclaré contre les Américains et qui exhortent à la résistance ?
Tout ceci indique que l’ « islamophobie » n’est pour ainsi dire d’aucune utilité en tant qu’outil analytique. Adopter ce concept, c’est accepter la forme la plus virulente d’équivalence théologique, et affirmer, en dépit de l’évidence, que toutes les traditions religieuses sont pareillement capables d’inspirer la violence. Dans de nombreux cas, cela fait partie de l’arsenal mis en œuvre pour salir la civilisation occidentale, en comparant les fautes des Chrétiens à un Islam fictif et idéalisé. Oser cette comparaison, c’est nier cette remarque judicieuse du philosophe Antony Flew, éminent athée (devenu théiste par la suite) : « Jésus est une figure charismatique extrêmement séduisante, ce que n’est absolument pas le prophète de l’Islam. »[5] À nouveau, il ne s’agit pas de prôner l’une ou l’autre théologie comme étant la seule réellement légitime, mais d’analyser le jihad islamique de manière réaliste. Et aussi de renforcer l’idée que la civilisation occidentale vaut la peine d’être défendue.
L’ « islamophobie » en tant qu’arme du jihad
L’accusation d’ « islamophobie » est fréquemment utilisée pour détourner l’attention portée aux jihadistes. Ainsi, en Suisse, suite à une recrudescence du militantisme jihadiste et à l’arrestation de huit personnes soupçonnées d’avoir aidé des islamikazes en Arabie Saoudite, certains Musulmans n’étaient aucunement d’humeur à faire le ménage dans leur communauté : « Ce que nous constatons », déclara Nadia Karmous, à la tête d’un groupe musulman féminin en Suisse, « ce n’est pas une augmentation de l’islamisme, mais une aggravation de l’islamophobie ».[6]
Ce schéma s’est reproduit un peu partout dans le monde ces dernières années, et l’ « islamophobie », industrie florissante, est passée dans le vocabulaire courant. Dans les pays occidentaux, l’ « islamophobie » a rejoint le « racisme », le « sexisme » et l’ « homophobie ». L’absurdité de tout ceci est bien illustrée par un récent incident en Angleterre : alors qu’une équipe de tournage filmait le harcèlement d’un Musulman pour un film intitulé « Islamophobia », deux badauds anglais, qui n’avaient pas remarqué les caméras, se détournèrent de leur chemin pour défendre la personne attaquée. Mais ni les cinéastes ni les journalistes ayant rapporté l’incident ne semblent avoir réalisé la signification de celui-ci, à savoir que les Britanniques ne sont peut-être pas aussi violents et xénophobes que le film en cours de tournage veut le suggèrer.[7]
L’historien Victor Davis Hanson a habilement expliqué le dangereux glissement de centre d’attention que l’ « islamophobie » implique :
En réalité, il n’existe pas un phénomène d’ « islamophobie » – en tout cas pas plus qu’il n’y avait de « germanophobie » à haïr Hitler ou de « russophobie » à détester le stalinisme. Toute injustice ou grossièreté qu’il puisse y avoir à « profiler » certains jeunes hommes du Moyen-Orient est minime par rapport aux efforts déployés par les fascistes islamiques eux-mêmes – ici aux U.S.A., au Royaume-Uni, aux Pays-Bas, en France, en Turquie, en Israël – pour massacrer des Occidentaux et faire exploser des bombes parmi des civils. Le vrai danger, pour des milliers d’innocents, ce n’est pas l’occasionnel fanatique évangéliste ou le politicien mal dégrossi vomissant l’Islam, mais l’anti-sémitisme et l’anti-américanisme pathologiques et savamment orchestrés qui inondent les ondes du monde entier depuis l’Iran, le Liban ou la Syrie bien sûr, mais aussi à partir de pays qui furent nos alliés, comme l’Égypte, l’Arabie Saoudite et le Qatar.[8]
Réforme ou refus de se rendre à l’évidence ?
Un étrange manque de sincérité de la part des réformateurs musulmans va souvent de pair avec les accusations d’islamophobie. En avril 2005, le Toronto Star brossa un élogieux portrait de la féministe musulmane indonésienne Musdah Mulia, se réjouissant de ce qu’elle « blâme les Musulmans, et non l’Islam, pour les inégalités entre hommes et femmes » dans le monde islamique. Ce n’est que l’un des nombreux articles publiés dans les quotidiens et les magazines du monde occidental qui dépeignent le « vrai » Islam comme étant une religion de tolérance, de liberté et d’ouverture. Pourtant l’idée que le « vrai Islam » est plus semblable au pacifisme des Quakers qu’à la religion d’Oussama Ben Laden est fausse et dangereusement fallacieuse. Elle maintient les gens dans l’ignorance quant aux motivations et aux buts réels des jihadistes.
Mulia, selon le journaliste Haroon Siddiqui, « porte le hijab mais précise que ce n’est pas exigé par l’Islam, une position soutenue par une importante majorité des Musulmanes indonésiennes, et même du monde entier, qui ne le mettent pas mais ne se sentent pas moins musulmanes pour autant. » Pourtant, ni Siddiqui ni Mulia ne font mention de la tradition islamique qui rapporte les instructions du prophète : « quand la fille devient pubère, il ne convient pas de voir d’elle une autre partie que le visage et les mains. »[9] Ils ne mentionnent pas non plus, en mentionnant qu’elle « souhaite l’abolition de la polygamie », que Mulia devra mener un combat extrêmement difficile, puisque le Coran dit aux hommes « d’épouser des femmes de leur choix, deux ou trois ou quatre ».[10]
Musdah Mulia, exulte Siddiqui, « n’est pas une féministe occidentalisée et laïque. C’est une spécialiste de l’Islam, et elle est titulaire d’un doctorat obtenu à l’institut des Études Islamiques » de Jakarta. « Elle y enseigne à temps partiel, mais son occupation principale est le poste de directrice de recherche au ministère des affaires religieuses, d’où elle harcèle le gouvernement. Lorsque ses patrons publièrent un rapport gouvernemental à propos de la mise à jour des lois religieuses l’an dernier, elle rédigea une critique de 170 pages qui les mit dans l’embarras et irrita les conservateurs. »
Mulia n’a pas toujours été une telle enquiquineuse. « Petite-fille d’un religieux », elle « a vécu dans un internat islamique et a grandi dans un environnement strict ». Elle garde des souvenirs cuisants de son enfance : « Je ne pouvais pas rire fort. Mes parents ne me permettaient pas de me lier d’amitié avec des non-Musulmans. Si j’en fréquentais, ils m’ordonnaient de prendre une douche après. » Mais ensuite, elle a voyagé « dans d’autres nations musulmanes » et a réalisé que « l’Islam offre de nombreux visages. Cela m’a ouvert les yeux. Une partie de ce que mon grand-père et les oulémas m’avaient appris était juste, mais le reste n’était que mythes. »
Scoop : L’Islam vécu par les musulmans n’est pas l’Islam authentique!
Qu’est-ce qui a donc mené à la transformation de Mulia ? Il s’avère que ses parents, son grand-père, les religieux, tous ont mal compris l’Islam, et qu’elle, Mulia, a mis la main sur le véritable Islam : « plus elle étudiait l’Islam, plus elle le trouvait moderne et génial. »
Le hijab, la burka, le tchador, la polygamie, le divorce qu’un homme peut décréter simplement en prononçant une phrase par trois fois, les lois successorales inéquitables, l’impossibilité pour les femmes de quitter la maison sans l’escorte d’un mâle de la famille dans nombre de contrées islamiques, l’interdiction même, dans certains pays musulmans, de conduire un véhicule… tout ceci, selon Mulia, n’a rien d’islamique. Après tout, dit-elle, « l’Islam a libéré les femmes il y a 1400 ans, bien avant l’Occident ».
L’affirmation selon laquelle Mahomet a amélioré le sort des femmes est curieuse. Elle est basée sur l’allégation selon laquelle les femmes étaient épouvantablement traitées dans la société arabe païenne. Mais les choses se sont-elles réellement améliorées avec la création de l’Islam ? Comme nous l’avons vu, même Aïcha, la bien aimée femme enfant de Mahomet, confia : « je n’ai vu aucune femme souffrir autant que les croyantes. »[11]
Tant de gens qui luttent pour les droits des femmes ou pour une plus large réforme de l’Islam adoptent la même attitude que Mulia. Ils ne peuvent pas admettre que c’est l’Islam lui-même, à travers ses textes sacrés, qui est responsable des problèmes qu’ils cherchent à résoudre. Ils expliquent d’un ton mielleux que les jihadistes, les terroristes, les wahhabites, ou les méchants du moment, quels qu’ils soient, « ont détourné l’Islam », sans offrir aucun plan cohérent pour transformer ces « détourneurs » d’Islam en des êtres paisibles et tolérants.
Mulia n’explique pas comment les « traditions et interprétations culturelles » auxquelles elle s’oppose sont nées dans les contrées islamiques. Comment les Musulmans d’Arabie Saoudite et d’Iran ont-il modelé leurs lois et façonné leurs mœurs si ce n’est à travers l’Islam ? Au-delà de l’essentiel de la foi, explique Mulia, la plupart des lois affectant les femmes sont la création des hommes ; « rien de tout cela n’a été faxé depuis les cieux ». Mais ceux qui légifèrent en Arabie Saoudite, en Iran, au Soudan et au Pakistan pensent précisément suivre un « fax des cieux », à savoir le Coran. Car en définitive, qu’est donc une série de révélations dictées par Allah à Mahomet sinon un « fax des cieux » ?
Comme tant d’autres réformateurs islamiques autoproclamés, Mulia semble poursuivre un noble but, mais elle contribue en fait à entretenir la confusion au sujet de l’Islam. Ibn Warraq l’a fort bien écrit : « Il y a des Musulmans modérés, mais l’Islam lui-même n’est pas modéré ». Trop de réformateurs musulmans pensent devoir défendre l’Islam à tout prix, quelles que soient les contorsions mentales à effectuer pour y parvenir – et quitte à passer sous silence certaines choses et à refuser de faire face aux éléments de l’Islam employés par les jihadistes pour justifier leurs actes. Les responsables (wahhabites, extrémistes, etc.), nous dit-on, ne sont que de « mauvais Musulmans ». Et pourtant, ce sont ces mêmes « mauvais Musulmans » qui s’empressent avec le plus de ferveur d’embrasser, dans tous les domaines de la vie, les véritables enseignements de l’Islam, tandis que ce sont les croyants les plus souples, les moins pratiquants, enfin les moins enclins aux interprétations littérales, qui traitent le mieux les femmes et sont le plus attachés à un certain pluralisme et à la coexistence paisible avec les non-Musulmans.
C’est un état des choses que même Musdah Mulia et ses semblables ne pourront refuser de voir éternellement.
Donner une fausse image de l’Islam
En plus de leurs refus de reconnaître que certains éléments déplaisants de l’Islam font bien partie de l’Islam « authentique », certains groupes de pression musulmans et leurs alliés qualifient systématiquement des comptes-rendus véridiques sur l’Islam de « discours incitant à la haine ». En décembre 2004, le CAIR réagit avec mauvaise humeur, comme on pouvait s’y attendre, aux propos tenus par un ex-officiel de la CIA, Bruce Tefft. Le CAIR[12] lui reprochait des déclarations telles que « le terrorisme islamique est basé sur l’Islam tel qu’il est révélé dans le Coran », « prétendre que l’Islam n’a rien à voir avec le 11 septembre, c’est délibérément ignorer une évidence et mal interpréter durablement les évènements » et « il n’y a pas de différence entre l’Islam et le fondamentalisme islamique, qui est une construction totalitaire ». Le CAIR appela la branche canadienne du Centre Simon Wiesenthal, sous l’égide de laquelle l’allocution de Tefft avait eu lieu, à « condamner ces commentaires islamophobes avec la plus grande vigueur. Dépeindre l’Islam et son livre sacré comme promouvant le terrorisme ne peut que conduire à aggraver les préjugés et l’intolérance envers les Musulmans ».
« En tant qu’organisation œuvrant soi-disant à ‹ favoriser la tolérance et la compréhension › », fulmina le CAIR, « le Centre Simon Wiesenthal doit immédiatement rejeter toute rhétorique islamophobe, et tenir son bureau canadien responsable de n’avoir pas récusé les opinions haineuses de l’orateur. »[13]
Bien entendu, beaucoup de musulmans préconisent le jihad en basant leur raisonnement sur le Coran et la Sunna, et Tefft n’a pas inventé cette connexion. Mais au lieu de réfuter ce lien en travaillant sur ces sources islamiques, le CAIR s’est attaqué à Tefft.
Le CAIR indique que le but de sa création consiste à « promouvoir une image positive de l’Islam et des Musulmans en Amérique » et déclare : « nous pensons que les déformations de l’image de l’Islam résultent la plupart du temps de la méconnaissance qu’en ont les non-Musulmans et de la réticence qu’ont les Musulmans à s’expliquer clairement. »[14] Cela sonne bien si vous êtes du genre bien-pensant sentimental – mais les remèdes offerts par le CAIR sont peut-être pires que le mal.
Dhimmitude des médias et des officiels
Que ce soit de peur d’alarmer la population, ou – de manière plus politiquement correcte – de crainte de blesser les Musulmans, ou encore pour ces deux raisons, la réticence des autorités à tirer des conclusions de certains signes témoignant d’une activité jihadiste aux États-Unis frise parfois le ridicule.
En avril 2005, des pompiers conduisant une inspection de routine dans un supermarché de Brooklyn y découvrirent deux cent airbags d’automobile et une pièce tapissée de posters d’Oussama Ben Laden et de photos de décapitations en Irak. Certaines pièces des airbags peuvent être utilisées pour fabriquer des bombes artisanales. Selon le New York Post, le propriétaire du bâtiment « a, selon les dossiers, fait de la prison à la fin des années 70 et au début des années 80 pour incendie criminel, comportement irresponsable, possession d’armes et conspiration ». Mais les autorités furent formelles : le stock caché n’avait rien à voir avec le terrorisme.
Ah bon? Avec quoi avait-il quelque chose à voir, alors ? La pratique du macramé ?
De même, lorsque quinze personnes furent tuées et plus d’une centaine blessées par des explosions dans une raffinerie pétrolière de Texas City, le 23 mars 2005, le FBI élimina rapidement le terrorisme des causes potentielles.[15] Lorsque des groupes jihadistes revendiquèrent la responsabilité des explosions, le FBI continua d’en faire peu de cas.[16] Puis, il apparut que les enquêteurs n’avaient visité le site que huit jours après les faits, et donc après avoir écarté l’hypothèse d’un acte terroriste. Un enquêteur ayant gardé une certaine indépendance d’esprit posa la question : « Comment pouvez-vous éliminer une possibilité alors que vous n’avez encore aucune idée de la cause ? »[17] Plus tard encore, on apprit que, contrairement à qui avait été rapporté initialement, non pas une, mais jusqu’à cinq explosions différentes avait eu lieu dans cette raffinerie.[18]
Il est possible que ces détonations aient été accidentelles, que cinq choses différentes aient cafouillé dans l’usine, déclenchant cinq explosions indépendantes et à peu près simultanées. Et peut-être n’y a-t-il eu aucune participation terroriste. Mais comment le FBI a-t-il pu conclure cela avant même d’enquêter ?
Et ce ne sont que deux exemples d’un schéma usuel, comme l’a documenté l’expert en terrorisme Daniel Pipes:
• Le 1er mars 1994, sur le pont de Brooklyn, un Musulman nommé Rashid Baz cribla de balles un minibus occupé par de jeunes garçons hassidim, tuant l’un d’entre eux[19]. Selon le FBI, il s’agissait d’une « crise de rage dans la circulation routière »[20].
• Le 24 février 1997, dans l’Empire State Building, un Musulman nommé Ali Abu Kamal ouvrit le feu sur des touristes, en tuant un et en blessant six autres avant de se donner lui-même la mort[21]. Le maire de New York, Rudolph Giuliani, informa le public qu’il s’agissait d’un « homme pour qui le monde était rempli d’ennemis ».[22]
• Le 4 juillet 2002, un Musulman nommé Hesham Mohamed Ali Hadayet ouvrit le feu sur les passagers présents au comptoir de la compagnie aérienne israélienne El Al à l’aéroport international de Los Angeles, tuant deux personnes. Le FBI déclara dans un premier temps que « rien n’indiquait qu’il s’agisse d’un acte terroriste ». Toutefois, après qu’il soit apparu qu’Hadayet avait pu être en contact avec Al Qaïda et était connu pour sa haine d’Israël, le FBI classa finalement l’affaire comme acte de terrorisme.[23]
• Les snipers de Washington, John Muhammad et Lee Malvo, qui sont liés à dix-huit fusillades et dix meurtres dans la région de Washington D.C. en octobre 2002, sont deux convertis à l’Islam. Avant qu’ils ne soient pris, les enquêteurs attribuaient ces crimes à un « homme blanc en colère » ; les malfrats s’avérèrent être deux hommes noirs. Après leur capture, les média firent constamment référence à John Muhammad en tant que John Williams, omettant de signaler sa conversion à l’Islam et son changement de nom. Et même après que les croquis de Lee Malvo représentant Oussama Ben Laden (qu’il nomme « un Serviteur d’Allah ») et ses divagations sur le « jihad » aient été révélés, les autorités continuèrent de minimiser la possibilité que les meurtres aient pu avoir un lien quelconque avec l’Islam ou le terrorisme.[24]
• Le 6 août 2003, à Houston, un Musulman nommé Mohammed Ali Alayed égorgea son ami Ariel Sellouk, un Juif. Alayed avait rompu ses relations amicales avec Sellouk après avoir commencé à se plonger davantage dans sa foi. La nuit du meurtre, Alayed téléphona à Sellouk et ils se rencontrèrent dans un bar avant de revenir à l’appartement d’Alayed, où ce dernier tua son ami. Dans le bar, personne n’a vu les deux hommes se disputer. Bien qu’Alayed ait tué Sellouk de la même façon que les bouchers jihadistes en Irak, et bien qu’il se soit rendu à la mosquée après avoir commis le meurtre, les autorités indiquèrent qu’il n’y avait « aucun signe que Sellouk (…) ait été tué à cause de ses origines ou de sa religion »[25].
Il y a beaucoup d’autres exemples similaires : lorsqu’un Musulman nommé El Sayyid Nosair assassina l’activiste politique israélien Meir Kahane à New York le 5 novembre 1990, les autorités attribuèrent le meurtre non pas au jihad mais à la dépression de Nosair ; et lorsqu’un copilote fit s’abîmer en mer le vol 990 d’EgyptAir, le 31 octobre 1999, causant la mort de 217 personnes, les officiels ne postulèrent aucune connexion terroriste, bien que le copilote ait répété à onze reprises « je m’en remets à Allah » en faisant plonger l’appareil.[26]
Les officiels essayent-ils de ne pas alarmer les Américains ? Ou bien tentent-ils de protéger d’innocents Musulmans d’un retour de manivelle ? Quelles que soient leurs motivations, ils maintiennent les Américains dans l’ignorance de la vraie nature du terrorisme jihadiste et de l’ampleur de cette menace.
__________
[1] Discours du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU, 7 décembre 2004 ; http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2004/SGSM9637.doc.htm
[2] Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, 1948 ; http://www.un.org/french/aboutun/dudh.htm#18
[3] Déclaration du Caire sur les droits de l’homme en Islam, 5 août 1990, article 22 ; http://www.aidh.org/Biblio/Txt_Arabe/inst_org-decla90.htm
[4] Stephen Schwartz, « The ‘Islamophobes’ That Aren’t », TechCentralStation.com, 28 avril 2005 ; http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=17874
[5] « Atheist Becomes Theist: Exclusive Interview with Former Atheist Antony Flew », Philosophia Christi, hiver 2004 ; http://www.biola.edu/antonyflew/flew-interview.pdf
[6] « Swiss arrests over Saudi attacks », BBCNews, 9 janvier 2004 ; « Muslims in Switzerland fear ‘witch-hunt », Swissinfo, 22 avril 2004
[7] Stuart Jeffries, « Coming to a small screen near you », Guardian, 13 janvier 2005
[8] Victor Davis Hanson, « Cracked Icons », National Review, 17 décembre 2004.
[9] Abou Da’oud, livre 32, n° 4092 ; http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/abudawud/032.sat.html#032.4092
[10] Coran 4:3
[11] Boukhari, vol. 7, livre 72, n° 5825 ; http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/072.sbt.html#007.072.715
[12] Conseil des relations américano-islamiques (Council on American-Islamic Relations)
[13] Conseil des relations américano-islamiques, « CAIR Calls on Wiesenthal Center to Repudiate Islamophobia », 11 décembre 2004 ; http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=1349&theType=NR
[14] Council on American-Islamic Relations, « About CAIR », http://www.cair-net.org/asp/aboutcair.asp
[15] Pam Easton, « Terrorism Ruled Out in Oil Refinery Blast », Associated Press, 25 mars 2005
[16] SITO Institute, « Qaeda al-Jihad in the United States Claims Responsibility For Texas Refinery Bombing », 25 mars 2005; « Terror cover-up in Texas City ? », WorldNetDaily.com, 5 avril 2005
[17] « Terror cover-up in Texas City ? », WorldNetDaily.com, 5 avril 2005
[18] « Multiple blasts struck refinery», Associated Press, 29 avril 2005.
[19] Uriel Heilman, « Murder on the Brooklyn Bridge », Middle East Quarterly, été 2001; http://www.meforum.org/article/77
[20] Daniel Pipes, « Le terrorisme ignoré », New York Post, 9 juillet 2002; http://fr.danielpipes.org/article/1722
[21] « Gunman shoots 7, kills self at Empire State Building », CNN, 24 février 1997; http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/24/empire.shooting/
[22] Daniel Pipes, « Aveuglement face au terrorisme », New York Sun, 8 février 2005; http://fr.danielpipes.org/article/2400;
[23] Daniel Pipes, « Le terrorisme ignoré », New York Post, 9 juillet 2002;
[24] Michelle Malkin, « Lee Malvo, Muslim hatemonger », Townhall.com, 10 décembre 2003; http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/michellemalkin/2003/12/10/160454.html
[25] Andrew Tilghman, « Saudi pleads guilty to killing Jewish friend in Houston », Houston Chronicle, 12 janvier 2004.
[26] Daniel Pipes, « Aveuglement face au terrorisme », New York Sun, 8 février 2005;
Claude Lévi-Strauss et l'islam
( l'islam ) Grande religion qui se fonde moins sur l'évidence d'une révélation que sur l'impuissance à nouer des liens au dehors. En face de la bienveillance universelle du bouddhisme, du désir chrétien de dialogue, l'intolérance musulmane adopte une forme inconsciente chez tous ceux qui s'en rendent coupables ; car s'ils ne cherchent pas toujours, de façon brutale, à amener autrui à partager leur vérité, ils sont pourtant ( et c'est plus grave ) incapables de supporter l'existence d'autrui comme autrui. Le seul moyen pour eux de se mettre à l'abri du doute et de l'humiliation consiste dans une néantisation d'autrui, considéré comme témoin d'une autre foi et d'une autre conduite. La fraternité islamique est la converse d'une exclusive contre les infidèles qui ne peut pas s'avouer, puisque en se reconnaissant comme telle, elle équivaudrait à les reconnaître eux-mêmes comme existants. ( Tristes tropiques )
dimanche 18 mai 2008
Une impressionnante vidéo sur l'islam, vous savez, cette religion de paix, d'amour et de tolérance.
Et merci à Bivouac d'avoir fait connaître cette vidéo !
http://www.bivouac-id.com/2008/05/18/exclusif-bivouac-id-londres-la-
police-acculee-au-mur-par-des-musulmans-la-video-en-francais/
http://www.bivouac-id.com/2008/05/18/exclusif-bivouac-id-londres-la-
police-acculee-au-mur-par-des-musulmans-la-video-en-francais/
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